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Abstract
We consider the classic problem of estimating group treatment effects when individuals sort
based on observed and unobserved characteristics. Using a standard choice model, we show
that controlling for group averages of observed individual characteristics potentially absorbs
all the across-group variation in unobservable individual characteristics. We use this insight to
bound the treatment effect variance of school systems and associated neighborhoods for various
outcomes. Across four datasets, our conservative estimates indicate that a 90th versus 10th
percentile school system increases high school graduation and college enrollment probabilities
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1 Introduction
Society is replete with contexts in which (1) a person’s outcome depends on both individual and
group-level inputs, and (2) the group is endogenously chosen either by the individuals themselves or
by administrators, partly based on the individual’s own inputs. Examples include health outcomes
and hospitals, earnings and workplace characteristics, and test scores and teacher value-added.1
Generations of social scientists have been interested in determining whether group outcomes differ
because the groups influence individual outcomes or because the groups have succeeded or failed
in attracting the individuals who would have thrived regardless of the group chosen. In some cases,
sources of exogenous variation are available that may be used to assess the consequences of a partic-
ular group treatment. However, assessment of the overall distribution of group treatments is much
more difficult, and researchers and governments frequently rely on non-experimental estimators of
group treatment effects (e.g. school report cards and teacher value-added).
In this paper we show that in certain circumstances the tactic of controlling for group averages of
observed individual-level characteristics, generally thought to control for “sorting on observables”
only, will absorb all of the between-group variation in both observable and unobservable individual
inputs. We then show how this insight can be used to estimate a lower bound on the variance in
the contributions of group-level treatments to individual outcomes. We also examine the conditions
under which causal effects of particular observed group characteristics can be estimated.
We apply our methodological insight and demonstrate its empirical value by addressing a classic
question in social science: How much does the school and surrounding community that we choose
for our children matter for their long run educational and labor market outcomes?2 To illustrate the
sorting problem consider the following simplified production function relating education outcomes
to individuals’ characteristics and the inputs of the schools/neighborhoods they choose. Let Ysi
denote the outcome (e.g. attendance at a four-year college) of student i who attends and lives near
school s.3 Ysi is determined according to4
Ys,i = [Xiβ +XUi β
U ]+ [ZsΓ+ZUs Γ
U ] . (1)
Let the vectors Xi and XUi be the complete set of child and family characteristics that have a causal
impact on student i’s educational attainment. Xi is observed by the econometrician and XUi is
1Ash et al. (2012) provide an overview of the issues involved in assessing hospitals. Doyle Jr et al. (2012) also discuss
the issues and provide a short literature survey. They are among a small set of studies that use a quasi-experimental
design to assess effects of particular hospital characteristics on outcomes. See Chetty et al. (2014) and Rothstein (2014)
for discussions and references related to the estimation of teacher value-added.
2See Duncan and Murnane (2011) for recent papers on school and neighborhood effects, with references to the lit-
erature. Meghir and Rivkin (2010) discuss alternative approaches to estimating school fixed effects and the effects of
particular school inputs, and highlight the problem of endogenous selection of schools and neighborhoods, among other
econometric issues.
3Despite the growing popularity of open enrollment systems, most school choice is still mediated through choice of
community in which to live, and most students still choose schools close to home even when given the opportunity. Thus,
we aim instead to measure the importance of the combined school/neighborhood choice.
4Later we will introduce additional components to the outcome model.
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unobserved. Analogously, the row vectors Zs (observed) and ZUs (unobserved) capture the com-
plete set of school and neighborhood level influences common to students live in s, so that the
school/neighborhood treatment effect is given by [ZsΓ+ZUs ΓU ].
Unfortunately, sorting will lead the school average of XUi , denoted X
U
s , to vary across s. This will
contaminate estimates of Γ and fixed effect estimates of the school treatment effect ZsΓ+ZUs ΓU .
While various studies have included controls for group-level averages of individual observables
(denoted Xs), the role played by such controls in mitigating sorting bias has generally been under-
appreciated.
Our key insight follows directly from the parent’s school/neighborhood choice decision—average
values of student characteristics differ across schools only because students/families with different
characteristics value school or neighborhood amenities differently. This means that school-averages
of individual characteristics such as parental education, family income, and athletic ability will be
functions of the vector of amenity factors (denoted As) that parents consider when making their
school choices. Thus, the school averages Xs and XUs will be different vector-valued functions of
the same common set of amenities: Xs = f (As) and XUs = f
U(As). The functions f and f U , are
determined by the sorting equilibrium and reflect the equilibrium prices of the amenities. If the
dimension of the underlying amenity space is smaller than the number of observed characteristics,
then under certain conditions one can invert this vector-valued function to express the amenities in
terms of school-averages of observed characteristics: As = f−1(Xs). But this implies that the vector
of school averages of unobserved characteristics can also be written as a function of observed char-
acteristics: XUs = f
U( f−1(Xs)). This function of Xs can serve as a control function for XUs when
estimating group effects.
We formalize this intuition by introducing a multidimensional spatial equilibrium model of
school choice and providing conditions under which this mapping is exact. Given an additively
separable specification of utility, we show that the average unobserved student variables XUs are a
linear function of Xs. As we make precise in Proposition 1 below, X and XU need not affect pref-
erences for all of the amenities A. Partition XUs into a subset X
U
1s that is correlated Xs and a subset
XU2s that is not correlated with Xs. Roughly speaking, the keys are that (1) Xs and/or X
U
1s affects
preferences for all amenities that any elements of XU2s shifts preferences for, and (2) that there are
enough elements of X to span this amenity space.
To take a simple example, suppose that school/neighborhood combinations differ in only one
dimension that people observe and systematically care about—perceived school quality—plus a
random idiosyncratic component specific to each family/location combination.5 Suppose further
that two uncorrelated characteristics, parental education (observed) and student athleticism (un-
observed), both increase families’ willingness-to-pay for school quality, and that both affect the
outcome Yit (e.g. graduation from high school). In equilibrium the expected values of both par-
5As will be made clear below, the weights families place on the amenities may also depend on other unobserved
characteristics that do not have a direct effect on the outcomes of interest. These additional characteristics are the κ∗i
variables in the analysis below.
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ent’s education and student athleticism will be increasing in perceived school quality, so that the
neighborhood average of parents’ education will be a perfect proxy for the neighborhood aver-
age of student athleticism. Now suppose that the quality of athletic facilities also varies across
neighborhoods and that student athleticism influences willingness to pay for better athletic facilities
but parental education does not. Then variation in the quality of athletic facilities would lead to
between-neighborhood variation in average athleticism that average parental education could not
predict. In this case we would need to control for the neighborhood average of another observable
characteristic (e.g. parental income) that either directly affects willingness to pay for athletic facility
quality or is correlated with student athleticism.
However, while this control function approach potentially solves the sorting-on-unobservables
problem, the group averages Xs control for too much. They will absorb peer effects that depend on
Xs and XUs . They will also absorb a part of the unobserved school/neighborhood quality component
that is both orthogonal to the observed school characteristics and is correlated with the amenities
that families consider when choosing where to live. As a result, our estimator will provide a lower
bound on the variance of the overall contribution of schools/neighborhoods to student outcomes.
The empirical part of the paper applies the control function approach in the school choice con-
text. Implementation requires rich data on student characteristics for large samples of students from
a large sample of schools, as well as longer-run outcomes for these students. We use four differ-
ent datasets that generally satisfy these conditions: three cohort-specific panel surveys (NLS72,
NELS88, and ELS2002) and administrative data from North Carolina.
For each dataset, we provide lower bound estimates of the overall contribution of differences
between school systems and associated neighborhoods to the variance in student outcomes: high
school graduation, enrollment in a four-year college, and adult wages (NLS72 only). In addition,
we also convert each lower-bound variance estimate into a lower bound estimate of the impact on the
chosen outcome of moving from a school system and associated neighborhood at the 10th quantile
in the distribution of school contributions to a 50th or 90th quantile system (a more intuitive scale).
Even our most conservative North Carolina results suggest that, averaging across the student
population, choosing a 90th quantile school and surrounding community instead of a 10th quantile
school increases the probability of graduation by at least 8.4 percentage points. In the NELS88
and ELS2002 the corresponding estimates are 4.7 and 6.8 percentage points, respectively, although
these may be less reliable due to sampling error in school average characteristics. We estimate
large average impacts despite the fact that our lower bound estimate only attributes between 1 and
4 percent of the total variance in the latent index determining graduation to schools. However, the
average impact of moving to a superior school on binary outcomes such as HS graduation or college
enrollment can be quite large even if differences in school quality are small, as long as a large pool
of students are near the decision margin.
Estimates of the impact of a shift in school environment on the probability of enrolling in a
four-year college and on the permanent component of adult wages (only in NLS72) are similarly
3
large: choosing a 90th instead of a 10th quantile school and surrounding community increases the
probability of four-year college enrollment by at least 11-13 percentage points (across all three
survey datasets), and increases adult wages by 19 percent (in NLS72).
The methodological part of the paper draws on and contributes to a number of literatures. First,
the basic idea that observed choices reveal information about choice-relevant factors unobserved by
the econometrician has been utilized in a number of settings, including the estimation of firm pro-
duction functions6, labor supply functions 7, distinguishing between uncertainty and heterogeneity
in earnings8, and even neighborhood effects9.
Second, this paper contributes to the theoretical sorting literature by presenting an analytical so-
lution to a multidimensional sorting problem.10 Third, this paper also overlaps with the literature on
identification in multinomial choice models in which preferences for observed and (in some papers)
unobserved product characteristics depend on both observed and unobserved consumer attributes.
Much of this literature is focused on estimating preferences and the sensitivity of choice to relative
prices and product characteristics in a world in which product prices will depend on product charac-
teristics.11 To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to point out that the relationship between
sorting on observables and unobservables implied by multinomial choice models and hedonic de-
mand models implies that group averages of observables can serve as a control for group averages
of unobservables in the estimation of group treatment effects.12
The empirical part of the paper adds to a large literature on school and neighborhood effects.13
A number of recent papers in this literature have employed experimental or quasi-experimental
strategies to isolate the contribution of either schools or neighborhoods to longer run student out-
comes. Oreopoulos (2003) and Jacob (2004) use quasi-random assignment of neighborhood in
the wake of housing project closings to estimate the magnitude of neighborhood effects on stu-
6See Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), and Ackerberg et al. (2006), among others.
7See, for example, Metcalf (1974) or Altonji (1982)
8See Cunha et al. (2005).
9Bayer and Ross (2006) consider using neighborhood house prices as a control function in estimating the impact of
neighborhood characteristics. This approach, however, requires that the underlying amenities that determine neighbor-
hood desirability can be combined into a single index of neighborhood quality.
10In the main text, we derive our key result using only the first order conditions of the consumer’s choice problem.
However, in the Appendix we present a closed form solution to the model for the special case in which amenities are
exogenous and in particular do not depend on group-averages of individual characteristics. Many of the papers in the
equilibrium sorting literature consider the case in which group characteristics affect choice but typically do not provide
analytical solutions, although they may be computed. See Epple and Sieg (1999), Bayer et al. (2007), and Bayer and
Timmins (2005). The model we explicitly solve has a continuum of choices, and so relates closely to the hedonic demand
literature, building on Rosen (1974), Heckman et al. (2010) among others. Browning et al. (2014) survey the literature
on sorting in marriage markets. A number of recent papers analyse labor market sorting based on firm and worker quality
(e.g, Lise et al. (2013)). In parallel work Lindenlaub (2013) presents a closed form solution to the equilibrium of a labor
market in which jobs differ in the skill vectors they require and workers vary in the skill vectors they supply.
11See for example, McFadden et al. (1978), McFadden (1984), Berry (1994), Berry and Pakes (2007) and Bayer and
Timmins (2005).
12Despite the similarity in titles, our analysis is completely distinct from that of Altonji et al. (2005) and Altonji et
al. (2013). These papers examine the econometric implications of how observed variables are drawn from the full set of
variables that determine the outcome and the treatment variable of interest.
13A recent example, with references to the literature, is Altonji and Mansfield (2011).
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dent outcomes. Similarly, the Moving To Opportunity experiment, evaluated in Kling et al. (2007),
randomly assigned housing vouchers that required movement to a lower income neighborhood to
estimate neighborhood effects. None of these studies finds evidence that moving to a low-poverty
neighborhood improves economic outcomes. However, using a very different approach that exploits
high quality data from tax records, Chetty and Hendren (In Progress) identify neighborhood effects
on long-run outcomes that are more consistent with our results.14
Deming et al. (2014), by contrast, exploit randomized lottery outcomes from the school choice
plan in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg district to estimate the impact of winning a lottery to attend a
chosen public school on high school graduation, college enrollment, and college completion. They
find large effects. Specifically, for students from low quality urban schools, the treatment effects
from winning the lottery are large enough to close 75 percent of the black-white gap in graduation
and 25 percent of the gap in bachelor’s degree completion. On the other hand, Cullen et al. (2006)
use a similar identification strategy with lotteries in Chicago Public Schools and find little effect on
the high school graduation probability.
In contrast to these papers, we do not exploit any natural experiments. Instead, we show that
rich observational data of the type collected by either panel surveys or administrative databases can
nonetheless yield meaningful insights about the importance of school and neighborhood choices for
children’s later educational and labor market performance.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our model of school choice, while
Section 3 formally derives our key control function result. Section 4 describes and presents results
from a monte carlo analysis of the finite sample properties of our control function approach. Section
5 presents a simple production function for long-run student outcomes. Section 6 describes our em-
pirical methodology for placing lower bounds on school and neighborhood contributions to long run
student outcomes. Section 7 describes the four datasets we use to estimate the model of outcomes.
Section 8 presents our results. Section 9 discusses other applications of our methodology. We give
special emphasis to the problem of assessing teacher value added. Section 10 closes the paper with
a brief summary of our empirical results and a discussion of potential theoretical extensions.
2 A Multinomial Model of School Choice and Sorting
In this section we present a model of how parents/students choose school systems and associated
neighborhoods, with the goal of placing minimal structure on parental preferences.
Assume that each location s ∈ {1, ...,S} can be characterized by a vector of K underlying latent
amenities As ≡ [A1s, . . . ,AKs]′.15 We adopt a money-metric representation of the expected utility for
the parents of student i from choosing school/neighborhood s, so that Ui(s) can be interpreted as
the family’s consumer surplus from their choice. We assume the utility function takes the following
14Aliprantis (2011) also stresses the limitations of the MTO study for uncovering the full distribution of school system
and neighborhood effects.
15The “prime” symbol denotes matrix or vector transposes throughout the paper.
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linear form:
Ui(s) = (
K
∑
k=1
λkiAks)−Ps+ εs,i ≡ λiAs−Ps+ εs,i. (2)
λi ≡ [λ1i, . . . ,λKi] is a 1×K vector of weights that captures the increases in family i’s willingness
to pay for a school per unit increase in each of its K amenity factors A1s, . . . ,AKs, respectively. Ps is
the price of living in the neighborhood surrounding school s, and εs,i is an idiosyncratic taste of the
parent/student i for the particular location s.
Consider projecting the willingness to pay (hereafter denoted WTP) for particular amenities
across parent/student combinations onto these families’ observable (Xi) and unobservable (XUi )
characteristics. In particular, suppose that Xi has LO elements, while XUi has L
U elements. Then
we obtain:
λki ≡
LO
∑`
=1
Xi`Θ`k +
LU
∑`
=1
XUi`Θ
U
`k +κki ∀ k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}
By converting equation (??) into matrix notation and substituting it into equation (2), we obtain:
Ui(s) = (XiΘ+XUi Θ
U +κi)As+ εs,i−Ps (3)
Θ (ΘU ) is an LO×K (LU ×K) matrix whose `k-th entry Θ`k (ΘU`k) captures the extent to which the
willingness to pay for amenity Ak can be predicted given the determinant X`i (XU`i ) of student out-
comes. The 1×K vector κki captures the components of i’s taste for the amenities A1, . . . ,AK that is
unpredictable given [Xi,XUi ]. Since [Xi,X
U
i ] is the complete set of student attributes that determine
Ys,i, the elements of κi influence school choice but have no direct effect on student outcomes. Note
that in the absence of restrictions on the elements of Θ and ΘU , this formulation of utility allows for
a fully general pattern of relationships between different student characteristics (observable or un-
observable) and tastes for different school/neighborhood amenities (given the additive separability
assumed in equation (2)).
Expected utility is taken with respect to the information available when s is chosen. The in-
formation set includes the price and the amenity vector in each school/neighborhood as well as
student/parent characteristics [Xi,XUi ]. The information set excludes any local shocks that are deter-
mined after the start of secondary school. It also excludes components of neighborhood and school
quality that are not observable to families when a location is chosen. The set of amenities may
include school/neighborhood characteristics that influence educational attainment and labor mar-
ket outcomes. Some of the amenities may include aspects of the demographic composition of the
school/neighborhood and thus are outcomes of the sorting equilibrium.
Parents i choose the school s if net utility Ui(s) is the highest among the S options. That is, s(i)
is determined by
s(i) = arg max
s=1,..,S
Ui(s)
6
3 The Link Between Group Observables and Group Unobservables
Next we characterize the equilibrium allocation of students to schools from the above choice
model. For analytic simplicity, in Section 3.1 we first consider a version of the school choice model
in which (a) we ignore the idiosyncratic school-family taste match by setting εsi = 0 ∀ (s, i), and
(b) we assume that S is sufficiently large so that it can be well approximated by a continuum of
neighborhoods that create a continuous joint distribution of amenities A. We revisit the finite choice
case in Section 3.1.2 and Section 4.
3.1 Using the First Order Conditions of the Family’s Choice Problem to Determine
the Link Between Xs and XUs
Under assumptions (a) and (b), choosing a school is equivalent to choosing the vector of ameni-
ties that maximizes utility, given the price function Ps = P(As). In addition, we assume that parents
behave competitively in the sense that prices are taken as given and choice is unrestricted. We also
assume that the equilibrium price function P(A) is increasing and convex, so that prices rise at an
increasing rate as amenities increase.16
The optimal choice is characterized by a system of K first order conditions, one for each amenity
factor. The conditions are
λ ′i ≡Θ
′
X
′
i +Θ
U
′
XU ′i +κ
′
i = ∇P(As(i)) , (4)
where∇P(As(i)) is the K×1 column vector of partial derivatives of P(A)with respect to A, evaluated
at A = As(i). The conditions say that the family chooses a community with a level of A such that the
family’s willingness to pay for additional units of A is equal to their marginal cost. Since P(A) is
strictly convex, second order conditions will be satisfied.
We now use (4) to study the relationship between XUs and Xs. First, decompose X
U
i into its
projection on Xi and the orthogonal component X˜Ui :
17
XUi = XiΠXU X + X˜
U
i (5)
Use the decomposition (5) to rewrite λi = XiΘ+ XUi ΘU + κi as λi = XiΘ˜+ X˜Ui ΘU + κi, where
Θ˜= [Θ+ΠXU XΘU ]. In its rewritten form, all three components of λi are mutually orthogonal. We
are now prepared to present the main proposition of the paper:
Proposition 1: Assume (i) preferences are given by (3), (ii) εsi = 0 ∀ (s, i), (iii) the price function
P(A) is increasing and strictly convex in A, (iv) the rows of the coefficient matrix ΘU relating tastes
16In Appendix A3 we explicitly solve for P(A∗s ) under stronger assumptions and show that it is increasing and strictly
convex.
17We use the symbol ΠDQ to denote the vector of the partial regression coefficients relating a dependent variable or
vector of dependent variables D to a vector of explanatory variables Q, holding the other variables that appear in the
regression constant. In the case of ΠXU X , D = XUi and Q = Xi.
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for A to XU are spanned by the rows of the coefficient matrix Θ˜ and (v) E(Xi|λi) and E(XUi |λi) are
linear in λi. Then the expectation XUs is linearly dependent on the expectation Xs. Specifically,
XUs = Xs[ΠXU X +Var(Xi)
−1R
′
Var(XUi )] forsome L
U ×LO matrix R (6)
3.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1:
Consider the projection of Xi and X˜Ui onto λi. Note that since (1) X˜Ui is uncorrelated with Xi by
construction, and (2) κi is uncorrelated with both Xi and X˜Ui ,
Cov(λi,Xi) = Θ˜
′
Var(Xi) (7)
Cov(λi, X˜Ui ) =Θ
U ′Var(X˜Ui ). (8)
Thus, these projections can be written as
Xi = λiVar(λi)−1Θ˜
′
Var(Xi)+ errorXi (9)
X˜Ui = λiVar(λi)
−1ΘU
′
Var(X˜Ui )+ error
X˜U
i . (10)
where E(errorXi |λi) = E(errorX˜Ui |λi) = 0 from basic regression theory and the linear in expectations
assumption (v). Using the first order conditions (4), we can rewrite these equations as:
Xi = ∇P(As(i))
′
Var(λi)−1Θ˜
′
Var(Xi)+ errorXi
X˜Ui = ∇P(As(i))
′Var(λi)−1ΘU
′
Var(X˜Ui )+ error
X˜U
i .
Note that since choice of s(i) depends on Xi, X˜Ui , and κi only through the K×1 index vector λi, the
error terms in the vector equations above are unrelated to s(i). Taking conditional expectations of
both sides of the above equations with respect to the chosen school s(i), we obtain:
Xs(i) ≡ E(Xi|s(i)) = ∇P(As(i))
′
Var(λi)−1Θ˜
′
Var(Xi) (11)
X˜Us(i) ≡ E(X˜Ui |s(i)) = ∇P(As(i))
′
Var(λi)−1ΘU
′
Var(X˜Ui ). (12)
By the spanning assumption (iv),
ΘU = RΘ˜ (13)
for some LU ×LO matrix R. Substituting the condition (13) for ΘU in (12) implies that
X˜Us(i) = E(X˜
U
i |si) = ∇P(ASi)′Var(λi)−1Θ˜
′
R
′
Var(XUi )
= ∇P(ASi)
′Var(λi)−1Θ˜
′
Var(Xi)Var(Xi)−1R
′
Var(XUi )
= Xs(i)Var(Xi)
−1R
′
Var(XUi ) (14)
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where the third line follows from substitution using (11). Combining (14) with equation (5), we
have
XUs(i) = Xs(i)[ΠXU X +Var(Xi)
−1R
′
Var(XUi )] . (15)
This completes the proof.
3.1.2 Interpreting Proposition 1: When Will the Spanning Assumption Hold?
Proposition 1 lays out the conditions under which XUs , the between school component of the
vector of student-level unobservables, will be an exact linear function of its observable counterpart
Xs. Remarkably, the dependence between the school averages XUs and Xs exists even when the vector
XUi is uncorrelated with the vector Xi at the student level.
18
The key restriction on preferences in Proposition 1 is the spanning condition (iv), which requires
that ΘU = RΘ˜ for some LU ×LO matrix R. In other words, it requires that the coefficient vectors
relating tastes for amenities to the elements of XUi are linear combinations of the coefficient vectors
relating tastes for amenities to the observables Xi and/or elements of XUi that are correlated with
Xi. Given the importance and subtlety of this spanning condition, however, this subsection further
develops the intuition underlying the condition and highlights cases in which it fails to hold.
Reconsider the more general function formulation used in the introduction. Let AX ⊆A represent
the subset of amenities that affect the distribution of observable school averages Xs. An amenity will
be included in AX if WTP for the amenity is affected by either Xi or elements of XUi correlated with
Xi. Likewise, AX
U ⊆ A represents the subset of amenities that affect the distribution of unobservable
school averages XUs . The between-school variation in Xs will only be driven by A
X , so that Xs =
f (AX) for some vector-valued function f . Similarly, XUs = f
U(AX
U
). In order to be able to write
XUs = f
U( f−1(Xs)) ≡ g(Xs), two conditions must be satisfied: (1) f must be invertible, so that we
can write AX = f−1(Xs), and (2) AX
U ⊆ AX , so that the amenity space that Xs spans is the relevant
amenity space that drives the variation in XUs (i.e. the range of f
−1 must encompass the domain of
f U ).
This intuition suggests that there are two fundamental ways the spanning condition ΘU = RΘ˜
can fail. First, Xi may affect tastes for more amenities than its own number of elements: |AX |> LO.
In this case, the function f (∗) is not invertible.19 In the case of the additively separable utility
function from (3), |AX | is captured by the row rank of Θ˜. In the context of the simple example
from the introduction, this condition might fail if the only observable characteristic were parental
18Note that if unobservable characteristics do not affect location preferences (i.e. students do not sort based on unob-
servables), so that ΘU = 0, then R = 0. By substituting ΘU = 0 into (12), we see that in this special case XUs = 0, so that
there is no across-school variation in average unobservable characteristics. In this case Var(ZsG) will accurately reflect
the school/neighborhood contribution.
19More specifically, what is relevant for invertibility is not the number of elements of Xi (denoted LO) per se but the
number of independent taste factors that these LO observables represent. Suppose for example, that mother’s education
and father’s education were both observed, but affected willingness to pay for each amenity in the same relative propor-
tions. Then adding father’s education to Xi would not make f (∗) invertible if it were not already when only mother’s
education was included in Xi.
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income, and the amenity space consisted of two imperfectly correlated factors: schools’ quality of
teachers and quality of athletic facilities (which are not perfectly correlated with one another). Even
if parental income affected WTP for both amenities, one would not be able to disentangle the quality
of athletic facilities from the quality of teachers based on only neighborhood averages of parental
income. We would need to observe a second individual characteristic, such as parental education,
in order to satisfy the spanning condition.
Second, the spanning condition can also fail if the unobservable vector XUi affects WTP for
certain amenities that no element in Xi predicts WTP for, so that AX
U 6⊂ AX . In the case of the
additively separable utility function from equation (3), AX
U ⊆ AX if and only if the row space of ΘU
is a linear subspace of the row space of Θ˜. Note, though, that a given element of Xi, say Xil , can help
predict WTP for a particular amenity Ak either directly by affecting taste for the amenity (so that
Θlk 6= 0), or indirectly by merely being correlated with an element of XUi that predicts taste for the
amenity (so that the (l,k)-th element of ΠXU XΘU 6= 0). Either will yield a non-zero value of Θ˜lk.
In the context of our simple example from the introduction, failure of this second requirement
would occur if the only observable were parental education, and parental education only directly
affected WTP for average teacher quality, and was uncorrelated with the unobservables (e.g. student
athleticism) that affected WTP for athletic facility quality. In this case the quality of athletic facilities
in the neighborhood would be an element of AX
U
but not AX , so that AX
U 6⊂ AX . Consequently,
variation in athletic facility quality would drive between-neighborhood variation in average student
athleticism that average parental education would not capture. Appendix Section A1 goes through
further examples that illustrate when the spanning condition will and will not be satisfied.
Are the conditions underlying the spanning assumption testable, and are they plausible? The
plausibility of condition (1) depends on the number and breadth of coverage of variables in Xi.
Condition 1 is testable. The model implies a factor structure for the vector Xs, where the number of
factors is determined by the row rank of Θ˜. A finding that the number of factors that determine Xs
is smaller than the dimension of Xi is consistent with the assumption that |AX | ≤ LO. A finding that
the number of factors is at least as large as the dimension of X is also technically consistent with the
assumption, but would strongly suggest that |AX |> LO.20
We investigate the factor structure of Xs in Section A2 of the Online Appendix. We find that
for each of our three survey datasets the estimated covariance matrix of Xs is rank deficient. This
means that each element of Xs can be written as a linear combination of a smaller number of latent
factors (generally between 25 and 30 factors, depending on the specification and dataset). Since the
rank of Cov(Xs) should reflect the number of amenity factors |AX |, this validates our assumption that
|AX | ≤ LO. Indeed, we further show that in each dataset an even smaller number of latent factors
(generally around 10) can explain 90% of the variance in the expected values Xs, suggesting that the
variation in student composition across schools is driven primarily by a handful of amenity factors.
Condition (2) is a statement about unobservables and is not testable without more structure than
20It is important to point out that Proposition 1 refers to the expected values E[Xi|s(i) = s] and E[XUi |s(i)] = s. The
observed values of Xs and Xus will deviate from the expectations when neighborhood/school sizes are not extremely large.
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we impose. However, we think that it is plausible in situations in which X contains a rich set
of variables that are likely to matter for student outcomes. For example, we use parental income
but not parental wealth. Both are likely to directly affect the education outcomes such as college
attendance, so sorting on wealth might be expected to lead to an overstatement of school effects.
However, the two variables are strongly positively correlated across families, and are both are likely
to influence WTP for a similar set of amenities. For both reasons the school average of parental
income is likely to serve as an effective control for the school average of parental wealth.
Note that the derivation of (6) does not require one to solve the model. If some of the neigh-
borhood amenities are functions of resident characteristics, the distribution of amenities will be
endogenous, and may result in multiple equilibria. However, the derivation is based only on a set of
necessary first order conditions, so the linear dependence between Xs and XUs will hold in any equi-
librium of the model. In Appendix Section A3 we derive an analytical solution for the equilibrium
mapping from student/family characteristics [Xi,XUi ,κi] to the school/neighborhood amenity vec-
tors they choose under somewhat stronger assumptions. The most important one is that As does not
depend on which families choose s, so that the joint distribution of amenities across neighborhoods
is exogenous. This is a restrictive assumption in the school choice setting, but may be plausible in
other settings (e.g. differentiated product choice). Since analytical solutions to multidimensional
sorting problems are quite rare, the solution we provide is likely to be useful in other applications.21
Finally, recall that in formally deriving the link between Xs and XUs above, we focused on a sim-
plified version of our original discrete choice model in which consumers choose from a continuum
of options, and the idiosyncratic taste match component εsi = 0 ∀ (s, i). Note, though, that in the ad-
ditively separable specification for utility in (3), εis enters the equation symmetrically with respect
to Xi and XUi , so that there is no a priori reason to believe that its addition should break the link
between Xs and XUs .
22 Nonetheless, in the next section we describe results from a series of monte
carlo simulations designed to address this issue along with a number of other issues related to the
finite-sample performance of our control function approach.
4 Monte Carlo Simulations
While Proposition 1 provides a strong theoretical foundation for our control function approach
to distilling school contributions to long run outcomes, it is derived from a continuous, infinite
21Much of the literature has either relied on models featuring a single, vertical dimension of quality or has resorted to
numerical solutions. An analytical solution to the multidimensional sorting problem allows researchers to make clearer
predictions about how the distribution of individuals across groups will change in response to changes in the distribution
of group amenities. Such a solution may also aid structural estimation of the joint distribution of amenities and of
preferences, facilitating full-scale welfare analysis of proposed policy changes.
22We conjecture that under a spanning condition analogous to (13) the quantiles of the conditional distribution
of unobservables f (XUi |As(i),s(i) = s) are a function of the quantiles of the conditional distribution of observables
f (Xi|As(i),s(i) = s) across s. The intuition is clearest in the case when Xi, Xui and As are all scalars. If Θ > 0 and
ΘU > 0, then increases in As increase the willingness to pay to live in s of persons with high values of Xi relative to
persons with low values. Consequently, the quantiles of X should be higher when As is higher. The same should be true
for XUi , suggesting a link between the quantiles of the two distributions.
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dimensional model of school choice. Furthermore, Proposition 1 characterizes the link between
the expectations of Xi and XUi given As. With a finite number of students per school, random
variation associated with κi and εsi will cause school averages at point in time to deviate from their
expectations. This could weaken the link between school averages of observable and unobservable
characteristics.
To investigate these concerns, in this section we summarize the results of a series of monte carlo
simulations that explore the properties of our control function approach across a number of key
dimensions. A full description of our simulation methodology and results is contained in Appendix
Section A4, while the results themselves are displayed in Appendix Tables A2 and A3.
The simulations are not intended to provide a full characterization of the finite sample properties
of our estimator. Such a characterization is a daunting task given the large number of parameters
that determine the full spatial equilibrium sorting of students to schools.23 Instead, our simula-
tions center around a stylized test case that is calibrated to represent a plausible description of the
school/neighborhood choice context. These simulations serve to 1) illustrate that the control func-
tion approach has the potential to be effective in settings where a large population sorts into a fairly
large number of groups, 2) demonstrate that re-introducing the idiosyncratic student-school match
components {εsi} back into the model does not undermine the basic control function result estab-
lished in Proposition 1, 3) highlight a few key factors that play a major role in determining the
degree to which average values of observable characteristics effectively control for average values
of unobservable characteristics, and 4) show that the control function approach is relatively robust
to small departures from the conditions laid out in Proposition 1.
All of our simulations consider combinations of model parameters which imply considerable
sorting across schools on a vector of unobservable characteristics. Our metric for evaluating the
effectiveness of our control function approach is the fraction of the between-group variance in the
outcome contribution of unobservable individual-level characteristics (Var(XUs βU) in our produc-
tion function below) that can be predicted using group-averages of observable characteristics. This
is the R2 from a regression of the potential bias from unobservable sorting, XUs βU , on the vector Xs.
The first key result is that the control function can work well even in settings where 1) individuals
have idiosyncratic tastes for particular groups, 2) there are only moderate number of total groups
to join, and 3) only a subset of these are considered by any given individual. In many of our
simulations in such settings over 97% of the variance in group-average values of unobservables
XUs βU is absorbed by controlling for a sufficiently large vector of group-average observables Xs.
The second result is that the control function approach is quite robust to the violations of the
spanning condition in which just a few outcome-relevant unobservables affect WTP for just a few
additional amenities that are not weighted by any component of the observable vector Xi. These
are arguably the most plausible cases when rich data on students and parents are available. Not
23The parameters include those characterizing the joint distribution of the individual characteristics affecting choice
[Xi,XUi ,κi], the joint distribution of the amenities As, and the distribution of the idiosyncratic tastes εsi. The parameters
also include the Θ and ΘU matrices that capture how observed and unobserved characteristics affect WTP.
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surprisingly, the control function approach fails when the Xi and XUi are orthogonal to each other
and Xi and XUi affect WTP for disjoint sets of amenities.
Finally, the third key result is that the effectiveness of our control function suffers when the
group-averages of the observables Xs are constructed using small samples of group members rather
than the full school population. Due to our reliance on such small samples in our three panel survey
datasets in the empirical analysis below, we investigate this issue further for our particular school
effects application in Section 7 and Appendix Section A7.
5 A Model of Educational Attainment and Wage Rates
5.1 The Determinants of Adult Outcomes
In this section we further develop and analyze the underlying econometric model of adult out-
comes presented in the introduction. This production function provides the basis for the lower
bound estimates of school/neighborhood contributions that we present below. Our formulation
draws loosely on theoretical discussions in the child development literature, the educational pro-
duction function literature, and the neighborhood effects literature.24 Let Ys(i)i denote the outcome
of student i whose family has chosen the school and surrounding neighborhood s(i) ∈ {1, . . . ,S}.
For the rest of the section we will usually suppress the dependence of s on i unless necessary for
clarity. In our application the outcomes will be comprised of high school graduation, attendance at
a four-year college, a measure of years of postsecondary education, and the permanent wage rate.
Ys(i)i is determined according to
Ys(i),i = Xiβ +XUi β
U +Zs(i)Γ+ZUs(i),iΓ
U +us(i),i . (16)
As discussed above, the student’s outcome contribution can be summarized by the index (Xiβ +
XUi βU ), where the row vector [Xi,XUi ] is an exhaustive set of child and family characteristics that
have a causal impact on student i’s outcome; the subvector Xi is observed by the econometrician
and the subvector XUi is unobserved. Since Xi and X
U
i may include non-linear functions of these
attributes, imposing that the individual attributes enter linearly is without loss of generality.
Analogously, the school/neighborhood outcome contribution is captured by the index (ZsΓ+
ZUs,iΓU , where the row vectors Zs and ZUs,i combine to form an exhaustive set of school and neighbor-
hood influences experienced by student i. Zs captures the influence of observed school/neighborhood-
level characteristics (which in our empirical work do not vary among students within a school),
while ZUs,i represents the remaining unobserved school/neighborhood influences, which will vary
between school attendance areas (e.g. quality of the school principal or the local crime rate) but
also within a school attendance area and within a school itself (e.g. trustworthiness of immediate
neighbors or distinct course tracks at the school). Indeed, some elements of ZUs,i may represent the
24A good example is Todd and Wolpin (2003), who provide references to the literature. See also Cunha et al. (2006).
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within-school components of Zs, so that such elements will contain no between-school variation.
The productivity parameters β , βU , Γ, and ΓU depend implicitly upon the specific outcome under
consideration as well as the time period in the case of wages.
The component us,i captures other influences on student i’s outcome that are determined after
secondary school but are not predictable given Xi, XUi , Zs, and Z
U
s,i. These might include the opening
of a local college or local labor market shocks that occur after high school is completed. It will prove
useful to write us,i as us+ui, where us is common to all students at school s and ui is idiosyncratic.
In practice we only have data on observed student and school inputs Xi and Zs at a single point
in time. Thus, some components of Xi associated with student inputs (for example, student apti-
tude) will have been determined in part by parental inputs from earlier periods (for example, parent
income). Such links make it difficult to interpret the coefficient associated with a given compo-
nent of Xi, since once we have conditioned on the other components, we have removed many of
the avenues through which the component determines Y . Consequently, we do not make any at-
tempt to estimate the productivity parameters β or βU , and thus do not attempt to tease apart the
distinct influences of child characteristics, family characteristics, and early childhood schooling in-
puts, respectively. Similarly, we do not attempt to remove bias in estimates of Γ stemming from
correlations between Zs and the omitted school/neighborhood factors ZUs,i. We aim instead to sepa-
rate the effects of schools and associated community influences on outcomes from student, family,
and prior school/community factors.
To be more specific about what we mean by school/neighborhood effects, first decompose ZUsi
into between- and within-school components: ZUsi = Z
U
s +(Z
U
si −ZUs ). Then, note that if a randomly
selected student attended school s1 rather than s0, the expected difference in his/her outcome would
be (Zs1Γ+ ZUs1Γ
U)− (Zs0Γ+ ZUs0ΓU). The outcomes of a specific student i will also differ across
schools because the values of (ZUsi −ZUs ) and us will differ, but the former are entirely idiosyncratic
and the latter are common to those who attend s1 or s0 but are determined after high school is
completed. We wish to quantify the importance of differences across neighborhoods in ZsΓ+ZUs ΓU .
Some of our estimates will also include differences due to us.
Note that while we allow the levels of school/neighborhood inputs Zs or ZUs,i to co-vary with
individual attributes Xi and XUi , we rule out explicit structural interactions (such as products) be-
tween school and student characteristics. Allowing for such non-separability does not break the
linear relationship between Xs and XUs , but would complicate the interpretation of the distribution
of the school treatment effects. We discuss the issues involved in footnote 29 while describing our
empirical methodology.
5.2 Toward an Empirical Model
In this section we discuss the parameters that OLS recovers when outcomes are regressed on
only the student-level and school-level variables that can be observed in a survey or administrative
dataset: Xi and Zs. We show that Proposition 1 implies restrictions on these parameters that allow
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the recovery of a lower bound estimate of the contribution of schools (and groups more generally)
to individual outcomes. We also present the more demanding conditions under which unbiased
estimates of the causal effects of particular group-level characteristics can be recovered.
To facilitate the analysis, first partition Zs into two subvectors [Xs,Z2s]. Xs is the vector of
school-averages of observable student characteristics, while Z2s is a vector of other observed school
level characteristics not mechanically related to student composition (e.g. teacher turnover rate or
student-teacher ratio). Partition the coefficient vector Γ≡ [Γ1,Γ2] analogously.
Next, consider projecting the full vector of unobserved school inputs ZUs,iΓU onto the vectors of
both the observed student level (Xi) and school-level (Zs) variables:
ZUs,i =
ZUs︷ ︸︸ ︷
(XsΠZUs ,Xs +Z2sΠZUs ,Z2s + Z˜
U
s )+
(ZUs,i−ZUs )︷ ︸︸ ︷
(XiΠZUsi ,Xi +
˜(ZUs,i−ZUs )) . (17)
Because we include in Zs the school-averages of each student-level variable in Xi, standard parti-
tioned regression results show that Xi will not predict any of the between-school components of
ZUs,i (denoted Z
U
s ) that Zs cannot predict. Thus, the matrix ΠZUsi ,Xi only captures the extent to which
student-level observable characteristics predict the within-school variation in unobserved school
characteristics. For example, parental education may predict the course track the student is assigned
to within the school. Likewise, Zs ≡ [Xs,Z2s], as a vector of school-level variables, cannot possibly
predict the student-specific deviations from the vector of school averages (ZUs,i− ZUs ). Thus, the
matrices ΠZUs ,Xs and ΠZUs ,Z2s only capture the extent to which unobserved influences common to all
students at a school can be predicted by the vector of school-level observables.
Next, in order to more clearly demonstrate the impact of student sorting as separate from simple
omitted variables bias, we project the vector of unobserved student-level characteristics XUi onto the
space of observable variables in two steps instead of one. In the first step, we regress XUi on the
student-level observable vector Xi only, as in equation (5):
XUi = XiΠXUi Xi + X˜
U
i . (18)
The matrix ΠXUi Xi captures the extent to which the unobserved student-level contribution can be
predicted by the observed student-level characteristics in the full population. It contributes to
standard omitted variables bias in the coefficient on Xi even in the absence of non-random student
sorting to schools. In the second step, we project the uncorrelated residual row vector from the
first-step, X˜Ui , onto both the student-level and school-level vectors of observables (Xi and Zs):
X˜Ui = XiΠX˜Ui Xi +XsΠX˜Ui Xs +Z2sΠX˜Ui Z2s + ε
X˜
si , (19)
where ε X˜si is row vector. If students with greater unobservable contributions to their long run out-
comes are more likely to sort into schools with particular observed characteristics Zs, then the ma-
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trices ΠX˜Ui Xs and ΠX˜Ui Z2s need not equal 0. Furthermore, even though each component of the vector
X˜Ui is uncorrelated with Xi (by construction from step 1), ΠX˜Ui Xi need not equal zero once school
characteristics have been conditioned on. For example, parents with low income (included in Xi)
who nonetheless choose an expensive school/neighborhood for their kids may be revealing high
residual parental value for student’s education outcomes; this unobserved characteristic might also
improve their kids’ outcomes regardless of school, thus belonging in XUi .
Substituting the projections (17), (18), and (19) for ZUs,i and X
U
i in equation (16), we obtain:
Ys,i = XiB+XsG1+Z2sG2+ vs+(vsi− vs), where (20)
B≡ [β +ΠZUsi XiΓ
U +(ΠXUi Xi +ΠX˜Ui Xi)β
U ] (21)
G1 ≡ [Γ1+ΠZUs XsΓU +ΠX˜Us Xsβ
U ] (22)
G2 ≡ [Γ2+ΠZUs Z2sΓU +ΠX˜Ui Z2sβ
U ] (23)
vs ≡ Z˜Us ΓU + ε X˜s βU +us (24)
vsi− vs ≡ usi+(ε X˜si − ε X˜s )βU +(˜ZUsi −ZUs )ΓU (25)
The expressions for G1,G2 and vs in (22), (23) and (24) reveal that the observable school com-
ponents XsG1 and Z2sG2 and the unobservable residual component vs all reflect a mixture of school
effects and student composition biases. Specifically, the components XsG1 and Z2sG2 will reflect
XsΠX˜ui Xs and Z2sΠX˜ui Z2s , respectively, which capture differences in average unobservable student
characteristics that are predictable by Zs after conditioning on average observable student character-
istics Xs. The unpredicted between-school component vs will reflect ε X˜s βU , which captures the part
of the average unobservable student contribution that is not predictable based on observed school-
level characteristics or average student-level characteristics. XsΠX˜ui Xs , Z2sΠX˜ui Z2s and ε
X˜
s βU are not
school/neighborhood effects, since any child who was reallocated to a school with a higher value of
these components could not expect an increase in test scores25. This analysis suggests that without
further assumptions about how students sort into schools, basic regression and variance decomposi-
tion techniques cannot be used to identify or even bound the contribution of schools/neighborhoods
to student outcomes. However, the next subsection shows that the assumptions laid out in Proposi-
tion 1 are sufficient to place a lower bound on the variance in school and neighborhood effects given
the production function (16) presented at the beginning of the section.
5.3 Using Proposition 1 to Bound the Importance of School/Neighborhood Effects
Section 2 provides conditions under which the school-average values of student observables Xs
and unobservables XUs are linearly dependent, as summarized in Proposition 1. To illustrate the
value to identification of this result, substitute the linear mapping of Xs into X˜Us from equation (14)
25Note that peer effects stemming from concentration of particular types of students at a school are captured by either
ZsΓ or ZUs ΓU .
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into the left hand side of the projection equation for X˜Us given by (19). One can immediately see
that ΠX˜Ui Xs =Var(Xi)
−1R′Var(XUi ), ΠX˜Ui Z2s = 0, and ε
X˜
s = 0. Thus,
G2 ≡ Γ2+ΠZUs Z2sΓU (26)
vs ≡ Z˜Us ΓU +us . (27)
We see that when the conditions of Proposition 1 are satisfied, the inclusion of Xs in Zs purges
both G2 and vs of biases from student sorting, so that Var(Z2sG2) and Var(vs) only reflect true
school/neighborhood contributions and, in the case of vs, later common shocks. However, the com-
ponents ˆVar(Z2sG2) and ˆVar(vs) only permit a lower bound estimate of the importance of school and
neighborhood effects, for three reasons. The first and obvious one is that the causal effect of Xs on
outcomes, XsΓ1, will be excluded from estimates of school/neighborhood effects. If peer effects are
important, this could lead to a substantial underestimation of the importance of school/neighborhood
effects. Second, if the school mean XUs has external effects, it is part of Z
U
s and therefore enters the
outcome equation separately from the individual level variable XUi βU . Since this component will
be absorbed by XsGˆ1, school/neighborhood peer effects associated with XUs will be excluded from
the estimate of school/neighborhood effects.
Finally, equation (22) reveals that Xs will also absorb part of the unobserved school contribution
ZUs via ΠZUs XsΓ
U . To see why, note that Xs spans the space of XUs because the variation in both Xs
and XUs is driven by the same underlying variation in the desired amenity vector, {A1s,A2s, ...AKs}.
Re-examining equation (11) above, we see that if Θ is of full column rank and the vector-valued
function ∇P(As) is invertible, then the system of equations can be inverted and the vector As =
[A1s,A2s, ...AKs]′ can also be written as a linear combination of some K-length subvector of Xs:
A′s = ∇P
−1(XsVar(Xi)−1Θ˜
′−1
Var(λi)) . (28)
Given that parents are likely to value the contributions of schools to student outcomes, many of the
characteristics ZUs that affect school quality are likely to be reflected in {A1s,A2s, ...AKs}. Hence,
while the inclusion of Xs in the estimated specification effectively removes sorting bias, it also
absorbs some of the variation in the underlying amenity factors for which Xs affects taste. Further-
more, if some elements of the school-level observables Z2s also serve directly as amenities in As,
then these elements will be collinear with Xs, undermining our ability to estimate the vector G2.
On the other hand, components of school/neighborhood quality Z2sΓ2 + ZUs ΓU that are either
unvalued or not fully known (or knowable) by parents at the time the school/neighborhood is cho-
sen will not be reflected in the vector of amenities A1s,A2s, ...AKs that are the basis of choice. Such
components will still produce variation in average outcomes across schools, and will break the
collinearity between Xs and Z2s. Similarly, if the outcome is measured after high school is com-
pleted, any common shocks that affect the outcomes of all those who attended a particular high
school will also not be absorbed by Xs, yet will produce between-school variation in outcomes.
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5.3.1 Identification of Γ2
The existence ofΠZUs Z2sΓ
U in the expression for G2 in (26) reveals that even when the conditions
of Proposition 1 are satisfied, G2 still reflects omitted variables bias driven by correlations between
Z2s and the unobserved school characteristics in ZU . Thus, estimating the vector of causal effects Γ2
associated with the school characteristics in Z2 will in general still require a vector of instruments.
However, the sorting model in Section 2 also sheds light on the circumstances in whichΠZUs Z2s =
0, so that Gˆ2 represents an unbiased estimator of the vector of causal effects Γ2. In particular,
suppose that each element of ZUs is either an amenity considered by individuals at the time of choice
or is perfectly predicted by the vector of amenities, so that ZUs = ΠZUs AsAs, for some matrix ΠZUs As .
Furthermore, suppose the matrix Θ˜ has full column rank and ∇P(As) is invertible, so that equation
(28) holds. This implies that school averages of observed student characteristics Xs also perfectly
determine ZUs . In this case, there will be no residual variation in Z
U
s for Z2s to predict in equation
(17), so that ΠZUs Z2s = 0, and Gˆ2 will be an unbiased estimator of Γ2.
26
Because we suspect that there are a large array of outcome-relevant school inputs, not all of
which are directly and accurately valued by parents when choosing schools, we do not assume
that ΠZUs Z2s = 0 in our empirical work. Thus, we do not attempt to interpret the individual coeffi-
cients estimated by Gˆ2.27 However, this analysis does suggest that controlling for group-averages
of individual characteristics can potentially remove part of the omitted variable bias from estimated
coefficients on group-level characteristics. This is particularly true in contexts where those choosing
groups are thought to consider and at least noisily observe most of the group-level characteristics
expected to have substantial causal effects. We return to this point when considering the estimation
of teacher value-added in Section 9.
6 Estimating the Contribution of Schools and Neighborhoods
6.1 Variance Decomposition
In the empirical work below, we estimate models of the form
Yi = Xiβ +XsG1+Z2sG2+ vsi, (29)
where Xs is a vector of school-averages of student characteristics, and Z2s is a vector of observed
school characteristics (such as school size or student-teacher ratio).
Consider rewriting this estimating equation as:
Yi = (Xi−Xs)β +Xsβ +XsG1+Z2sG2+(vsi− vs)+ vs (30)
26Var(ZUs ) = 0 will also lead to unbiased estimates of Γ2, but requires the unrealistic assumption that all outcome-
relevant school inputs are observed.
27See Meghir and Rivkin (2011) for a recent discussion of some of the issues in estimating the effects of particular
school characteristics. A key source of bias they highlight is the vector of omitted school characteristics ZUs .
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Then we can decompose the variance in Yi into observable and unobservable components of both
within- and between- school variation via:
Var(Yi) =Var(Yi−Ys)+Var(Ys) (31)
= [Var((Xi−Xs)β )+Var(vsi− vs)]+ (32)
[Var(Xsβ )+2Cov(Xsβ ,XsG1)+2Cov(Xsβ ,Z2sG2)+Var(XsG1)+
2Cov(XsG1,Z2sG2)+Var(Z2sG2)+Var(vs)] (33)
Motivated by the model of sorting presented in Section 2, we introduce two alternative lower bound
estimates of the contribution of school/neighborhood choice to student outcomes.
The first is Var(Z2sG2)+Var(vs). Due to the presence of Xs, it will be purged of any effects
of student sorting (observable or unobservable). Thus, it isolates only school/neighborhood factors.
However, in addition to the unpredicted component of school/neighborhood contributions (Z˜Us ΓU ),
Var(vs) will include us, common location-specific shocks (such as local labor demand shocks) that
occur after the chosen cohort has completed high school. One can argue that such shocks should
not be attributed to schools because they are beyond the control of school or town administrators.
Consequently, we also consider a second, more conservative lower bound estimate: Var(Z2sG2).
This estimate only attributes to schools/neighborhooods the part of residual between-school varia-
tion that could be predicted based on observable characteristics of the schools at the time students
were attending. Var(Z2sG2) excludes true school quality variation that is orthogonal to observed
characteristics, but also removes any truly idiosyncratic local shocks that occur after graduation.
Appendix Sections A5 and A6 describe the process by which the coefficients B, G1, and G2 are
estimated, as well as the process by which the empirical variance decomposition is performed. The
implementation differs depending on whether the outcome is binary or continuous.
6.2 Interpreting Our Lower Bound Estimates
The static sorting model presented in Section 2 is silent about when in a student’s childhood the
school/neighborhood decision is made. To illustrate how different assumptions about timing affect
the interpretation of our bounds, consider first the case in which changing schools/communities is
costless, so that each family decides each year where to live and send their children to school.
In this case, if the data are collected in 10th grade (as in ELS2002), then any impact of prior
schools/neighborhoods can be thought of as entering the outcome equation by altering the observ-
able or unobservable student contributions Xi and XUi . Thus, if prior schooling inputs affect WTP
for school/neighborhood amenities, our control function argument suggests that 10th grade school
averages of Xi and XUi will absorb all between-school variation in prior school contributions. In
this case, the residual variance contributions Var(Z2sG2) or Var(Z2sG2 + vs) that we identify will
represent a lower bound on the contributions of only the high schools and their surrounding neigh-
borhoods to our outcomes.
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Now consider the opposite extreme: moving costs are prohibitive, and each family makes a
one time choice about where to settle down when they begin to have children. Suppose that the
observed characteristics Xi are unaffected by early schooling.28 Then Xs will span the subspace
of the school/neighborhood amenities As as well as XUs as they existed when the family made its
choice. In this scenario, the residual variance contributions Var(Z2sG2) or Var(Z2sG2 + vs) that
we identify will represent a lower bound on the variation in contributions to our later outcomes of
entire sequences of schools (elementary, middle, and high) and entire childhoods of neighborhood
exposure. In reality, of course, moving costs are substantial but not prohibitive, so that our estimates
probably reflect a mix of elementary school and high school contributions, with a stronger weight
on high school contributions. However, note that as long as high school quality in a neighborhood
is positively correlated with elementary and middle school quality, a lower bound estimate of the
variance of high school contributions is itself a (very conservative) lower bound estimate of the
variance of contributions of entire school systems. Thus, since our goal is to create an inviolable
lower bound, the safest interpretation is that our estimates represent lower bounds on the variance
of the cumulative effects of growing up in different school systems/neighborhoods.
6.3 Measuring the Effects of Shifts in School/Community Quality
The fraction of outcome variance unambiguously attributable to school/neighborhood factors
provides a good indication of the importance of school/community factors relative to student-
specific factors. However, the effect of a shift in school/community quality from the left tail of
the distribution to the right tail of the distribution might be socially significant even if most of the
outcome variability is student-specific. This is particularly true in the case of binary outcomes such
as high school graduation and college enrollment, where many students may be near the decision
margin. Below we report lower bounds on the effect of a shift in school/neighborhood quality from
1.28 standard deviations below the mean to 1.28 standard deviations above the mean. This would
correspond to a shift from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile if this component has a normal
distribution. We interpret these as lower bound estimates of the average change in outcomes from a
10th-to-90th quantile shift in the full distribution of school/neighborhood quality, where the average
is taken over the distribution of student contributions.
The more comprehensive estimates use V̂ar(Z2sG2+ vs) to calculate the 10th-90th shifts, while
the more conservative estimates that seek to remove common shocks use V̂ar(Z2sG2). For binary
outcomes, we estimate the effect of the shift in Z2sG2 via:
E[Yˆ 90− Yˆ 10] = 1
I ∑i
Φ(
[XiBˆ+XsGˆ1+Z2sGˆ2+1.28(Var(Z2sG2)).5]
(1+V̂ar(vs)).5
)
− 1
I ∑i
Φ(
[XiBˆ+XsGˆ1+Z2sGˆ2−1.28(Var(Z2sG2)).5]
(1+V̂ar(vs)).5
) (34)
28As outlined in Section 7 below, we choose a set of variables in Xi that satisfies this property in our baseline specifi-
cation for each dataset.
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This average effectively integrates over the distribution of XiB+XsG1 + vsi, but uses the empirical
distributions of XiB and XsG1 (since they are observed) instead of imposing normality. Note that the
scale of the latent index Yi is unobserved, so we have normalized Var(vsi− vs) to 1.
We estimate the effect of the shift in Z2sG2+ vs analogously via:
E[Yˆ 90− Yˆ 10] = 1
I ∑i
Φ(
[XiBˆ+XsGˆ1+Z2sGˆ2+1.28(Var(Z2sG2+ vs)).5]
(1)
)
− 1
I ∑i
Φ(
[XiBˆ+XsGˆ1+Z2sGˆ2−1.28(Var(Z2sG2+ vs)).5]
(1)
) (35)
We also report lower bound estimates of the impact of a 10th-to-50th percentile shift in school/neighborhood
quality. For the binary outcomes, the impact of a shift in either Z2sG2 or (Z2sG2 + vs) will depend
on the values of a student’s observable characteristics, XiB. Thus, we report average impacts for
certain subpopulations of interest as well.29
7 Data
Our analysis uses data from four distinct sources. The first three sources consist of panel sur-
veys conducted by the National Center for Education Statistics: the National Longitudinal Study of
1972 (NLS72), the National Educational Longitudinal Survey of 1988 (NELS88), and the Educa-
tional Longitudinal Survey of 2002 (ELS2002). These data sources possess a number of common
properties that make them well suited for our analysis. First, each samples an entire cohort of Amer-
ican students. The cohorts are students who were 12th graders in 1972 in the case of NLS72, 8th
graders in 1988 for NELS88, and 10th graders in 2002 for ELS02. Second, each source provides a
representative sample of American high schools or 8th grades and samples of students are selected
within each school. Both public and private schools are represented.30 Enough students are sam-
pled from each school to permit construction of estimates of the school means of a large array of
student-specific variables and to provide sufficient within-school variation to support the variance
decomposition described above. Third, each survey administered questionnaires to school admin-
29Recall that we have ruled out interactions between Xi or XUi and Zs or Z
U
s in the production of Yi. To see how such
nonseparabilities might be addressed, consider the simple case in which the interaction involves observed student and
school characteristics. Suppose, for example, that low income students benefit disproportionately from a low student
teacher ratio, one of the elements of Z2s. One could add the interaction between family income and the student/teacher
ratio to the outcome equation. If Proposition 1 holds, then the interaction between family income and the student teacher
ratio will be unrelated to the error term conditional on Xs, which includes the mean of family income. One can estimate
the coefficient on the interaction term.
However, more generally, with nonseparable models schools may no longer be ordered. The best school for a low
income student may not be the best school for a high income student. When the nonseparability involves observed
variables, one may rank schools based on their average performance over the distribution of observed characteristics, and
define the 10th and 90th percentile schools accordingly. Alternatively, one could identify the 10th percentile school and
the 90th percentile school for each student, evaluate the difference in outcomes that the two schools, and then average
over all students.
30We include private schools because they are an important part of the education landscape. However, the connection
between characteristics of the school and characteristics of the neighborhood may be weaker for private school students.
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istrators in addition to sampled individuals at each school. This provides us with a rich set of both
individual-level and school-level variables to examine, allowing a meaningful decomposition of ob-
servable versus unobservable variation at both levels of observation. Fourth, each survey collects
follow-up information from each student past high school graduation, facilitating analysis of the im-
pact of high school environment on two or more of the outcomes economists and policymakers care
most about: the dropout decision, college enrollment and completion decisions, and wage profiles.
While these common properties are very helpful, each survey displays idiosyncratic features
and questions that complicate efforts to compare results across time. In our previous work (Altonji
and Mansfield (2011)) we restricted attention only to variables that are available and measured
consistently across all three datasets. However, because the efficacy of the control function approach
introduced in this paper depends on the richness and diversity of our student-level measures, for each
dataset we include in X student-level measures that may not appear in the other datasets.
In our “baseline” specification we only use student-level characteristics that are unlikely to be
affected by the high school the child attends. However, we also provide results from a “full” spec-
ification which includes in Xi measures of student behavior, parental expectations, and student aca-
demic ability (standardized test scores). Such measures may be influenced directly by school inputs,
so including them could cause an underestimate of the contribution of school-level inputs (our lower
bound estimates will be too conservative). On the other hand, excluding such measures could in-
stead cause an overestimate of the contribution of school-level inputs if this sparser set of student
observables no longer satisfies the spanning condition stated in Proposition 1. In this case there
would exist differences in average unobservable student contributions to outcomes across schools
that are not predicted by the vector of school averages of observable characteristics. Appendix Ta-
bles A5 - A8 list the final choices of individual-level and school-level explanatory measures used in
each dataset.
The one major drawback associated with the three panel surveys is that only around 20 students
per school are generally sampled. The simulation results discussed in Section 4 suggest that samples
of this size can erode the ability of sample school averages of observable characteristics to serve
as an effective control function for variation in average unobservable student contributions across
schools.
Consequently, we also exploit administrative data from North Carolina on the universe of public
schools and public school students (including charter schools) in the state. Since the North Carolina
data contains information on every student at each school, it does not suffer from the same small
subsample problem as the panel surveys. Furthermore, we can use the North Carolina data to assess
the potential for bias in our survey-based estimates more directly. Specifically, we draw samples
of students from North Carolina schools using either the NLS72, NELS88, or ELS2002 sampling
schemes and re-estimate the model for high school graduation using these samples. By comparing
the results derived from such samples to the true results based on the universe of students in North
Carolina, we can determine which if any of the survey datasets is likely to produce reliable results.
Appendix Table A4 reports the results of this exercise. It shows that using school sample sizes
22
whose distributions match the NLS72, NELS88, or ELS2002 distributions generates only relatively
minor biases, generally increasing V̂ar(Z2sG2) and decreasing V̂ar(Z2sG2 + vs) by less than ten
percent of their full sample values.
The North Carolina data are also the most recent: data are collected for all 2004-2006 public
school 9th graders. On the other hand, the data we possess does not link student records to college
attendance or future wages, so that the only outcome we observe is high school graduation. The set
of observable characteristics is also not as diverse as in the panel surveys, though it is surprisingly
rich for administrative data. Table A8 provides a full list of the student- and school-level variables
included in specifications using the North Carolina data.
The outcome variables are defined as follows. The measure of college attendance is an indicator
for whether the student is enrolled in a four year college in the second year beyond the high school
graduation year of his/her cohort. It is available in each dataset except the North Carolina data.31
The sample college enrollment rate is 27 percent in NLS72, 31 percent in NELS88, and 37 percent
in ELS2002. For NELS88 and ELS2002 the measure of high school graduation is an indicator for
whether a student has a high school diploma (not including a GED) as of two years after the high
school graduation year of his/her cohort. For the North Carolina data, the measure is an indicator
for whether the student is classified as graduated for the official state reporting requirement. Notice,
though, that since ELS2002 first surveys students in 10th grade, it misses a substantial fraction of
the early dropouts. Indeed, in NELS88, about one third of the 16 percent who eventually drop out do
so before the first follow up survey in the middle of 10th grade. The North Carolina data considers
students as eligible for official dropout statistics if they are enrolled in a North Carolina school at the
beginning of 9th grade, so there is little scope for underestimating the incidence of dropout. Given
that NLS72 first surveys students in 12th grade, we cannot properly examine dropout behavior in
this dataset. However, because NLS72 re-surveys students in 1979 and 1986, when respondents are
around 25 and 32 years old, respectively, we can use it to analyze completed years of postsecondary
education and wages during adulthood. We use years of academic education as of 1979, because
attrition and subsampling reduced the 1986 sample by a considerable amount relative to the 1979
follow-up survey, and most respondents have completed their education as of 1979. For the wage
analysis, we include only respondents who report wages in both 1979 and 1986. The full variance
decompositions described in Section 6 are provided for each of our outcomes in Online Appendix
Tables A9, A10, and A11.
In each specification, we restrict our sample to those individuals whose school administrator
filled out a school survey, and who have non-missing information on the outcome variable and the
following key characteristics: race, gender, SES, test scores, region, and urban/rural status.32 We
then impute values for the other explanatory variables to preserve the sample size, since no one
other variable is critical to our analysis.33 Finally, each specification makes use of a set of panel
31However, in NLS72 enrollment status is reported in January-March of the second full school year after graduation,
while in NELS88 and ELS2002 it is reported in October.
32SES and urban/rural status are not available in the North Carolina data.
33This results in sample sizes for the four year college enrollment analyses of: 12,100 for NLS72, 10,990 for NELS88,
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weights. The appropriate weights depend on the analysis. Our rationale for using weights and the
details of how we construct them are provided in Online Appendix Section A8.
8 Results
We now turn to results. Along with the point estimates, we report bootstrap standard errors
estimates based on re-sampling schools with replacement, with 150 replications. To preserve the
size distribution of the samples of students from particular schools, we divide the sample into five
school sample size classes and resample schools within class.
8.1 High School Graduation
Panel A of Table 1 displays our lower bound estimates of the fraction of variance in the latent
index that determines high school graduation that can be directly attributed to school/neighborhood
choices for each dataset. The first row presents estimates that exclude Var(vs) (labeled “no unobs”),
while the second row presents estimates that includes Var(vs) (labeled “w/ unobs”). However,
recall that the motivation for excluding vs is that it may reflect common shocks that occur after
high school that may not be responsive to any changes in school or neighborhood policies. Since
graduation is not a post-secondary outcome, vs is likely to contain only school and neighborhood
contributions that are orthogonal to the observed school-level measures Z2s (or sorting bias if the
spanning condition from Proposition 1 fails). Thus, for high school graduation we focus on the
results that contain vs. The first column displays the results from the baseline specification using the
North Carolina data: our lower bound estimate is that at least 4.9 percent of the total student-level
variance can be attributed exclusively to school system and neighborhood contributions. Since the
set of observed individual-level measures Xi is somewhat sparse in the North Carolina data, it is
possible that our control function of school-averages Xs does not span the full amenity space, so that
unobservable sorting bias may contribute to this estimate. Thus, the second column displays results
from the full specification that augments Xi by adding past test scores and measures of behavior.
Since these measures could potentially have been altered by the school, including them removes
some true school system contributions, but also makes the spanning condition in Proposition 1
more plausible. The estimated lower bound falls from 4.9 percent to 3.6 percent of the latent index
variance.
Comparing the North Carolina results to those of NELS88 (Columns 3 and 4) and ELS2002
(Columns 5 and 6), a couple of noteworthy patterns emerge. First, across both specifications and
both lower bound estimates, NELS88 features smaller fractions of outcome variance unambigu-
and 12,440 for ELS2002. The sample sizes for the high school graduation analyses are 11,340 for NELS88, and 12,370
for ELS2002, and 297,518 for North Carolina respectively. The analysis of years of postsecondary education uses 12,070
observations from NLS72, and the wage analysis uses 4,930 individuals with 9,860 wage observations. We also create
a missing indicator for mother’s education, and include mother’s education combined with the missing indicator when
performing imputation, along with school averages of all the key characteristics above.
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ously attributable to schools/neighborhoods than either NC or ELS2002 (∼ 1% relative to∼ 2-3%).
One possible explanation for this finding is that NELS88 school-level observables (Z2s) reflect the
8th grade school environment while the corresponding measures in the other two datasets reflect
the high school environment. It could be that the nature of the high school environment is partic-
ularly critical to dropout prevention. Second, comparing Row 2 across columns, we see that the
North Carolina administrative data features the largest gap between the lower bound estimates that
include versus exclude the school level residual, vs, while the gap is negligible for ELS2002. This
is not surprising; the North Carolina data has the sparsest set of school-level observables, which
leads to a small Var(Z2G2) relative to Var(vs), since less true variation in school quality is captured
by observables. North Carolina also has the sparsest set of student-level observables (even in the
full specification), which may cause vs to contain some between-school variation in student unob-
servables XUs βU that is unabsorbed by the control function (the spanning condition in Proposition 1
fails). By contrast, ELS2002 has the richest set of both student-level and school-level observables,
so that there is very little residual school-level variation that cannot be captured by either the control
function Xs or the school-level observables Z2s.
The small fractions of variance attributed to schools in Panel A are consistent with the consider-
able literature emphasizing the importance of student talent, parental inputs, and even luck relative
to school and neighborhood inputs in determining who completes high school. However, to get a
more intuitive sense of the difference that an effective school system and neighborhood can make,
in Panel B we use these two alternative lower bound variance estimates to form estimates of the
average impact on the probability of graduation across the distribution of student contributions of
moving from a school at the 10th percentile of the distribution of school/neighborhood contribu-
tions to a school at the 90th percentile. We can think of this as a thought experiment in which two
students at each quantile in the student contribution distribution are placed either in the 10th or the
90th quantile school system, and the difference in the graduation status of these two pairs is summed
over all such pairs.
The most striking feature of the results is the large magnitude of the estimated changes in gradu-
ation rates. For North Carolina, the estimate from the baseline specification suggests that, averaged
across the student distribution, attending a 90th quantile school increases graduation rates by a
whopping 17.4 percentage points relative to a school at the 10th quantile (from 67.6% to 85.0%)
The corresponding estimates are 9.8 percentage points for NELS88 (80.7% to 90.5%) and 8.3 per-
centage points for ELS2002 (86.0% to 94.3%). Even the more conservative estimates from the
full specification, which likely removes mostly true school/neighborhood contributions, suggest in-
creases in graduation rates from a 10th-to-90th quantile shift of 15.2, 7.5 and 7.0 percentage points
in NC, NELS88, and ELS2002, respectively. Notice further that these estimates are quite large de-
spite the fact that the fractions of variance upon which they are based is quite small: 3.6, 1.6, and
2.5 percent for NC, NELS88 and ELS2002. One reason for this seeming disconnect is that squaring
of deviations to produce variances will naturally mute moderate differences in school contributions
relative to the standard deviations on which the 10-90 shifts are based. A second reason may be
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related to our reliance on the probit function and the assumption of normality. If the true distri-
bution of latent student contributions is normal, and the graduation rate is not too high, then there
is likely to be large mass of students near the decision margin. Thus, even a small push from the
surrounding school/neighborhood environment may be enough to induce a significant fraction of
students to graduate.
Second, notice that even though the estimated lower bound fractions of variance were smaller
for NELS88 than for ELS2002 in Row 2 of Panel A, the 10th-90th impact estimates displayed in
Row 2 of Panel B are larger for NELS88. This is due to differences in the sample average graduation
rates across the datasets. The graduation rate is 76 percent in the North Carolina data, 86 percent
in NELS88, and 90 percent in ELS2002. As a result, a shift of the same magnitude will induce a
greater increase in NELS88 than in ELS2002 (and an even larger shift in NC), because there seem
to be fewer students near the decision margin. Intuitively, as the sample average converges to 100
percent graduation, the variation in the latent index determining the personal relative benefit from
graduating becomes less relevant, as the entire population is far from the decision threshold .
Assuming the conditions of Proposition 1 are satisfied or nearly satisfied, the large lower bound
estimates suggest that school systems and neighborhoods have a considerable role to play in deter-
mining which students graduate high school.
8.2 Enrollment in a Four Year College
Panel A of Table 2 presents results for the decomposition of the latent index determining en-
rollment in a 4-year college. Comparing the baseline specifications from NLS72, NELS88, and
ELS2002 (Columns 1, 3, and 5), we observe a surprising consistency in both lower bound es-
timates of the school/neighborhood contribution across datasets and generations. Estimates that
exclude the between-school residual vs attribute at least 1.8 to 2.6 percent of the outcome variance
to schools/neighborhoods, while estimates that include vs attribute 3.8 to 4.6 percent. Including
test scores and behavioral variables reduces these lower bound estimates in a consistent fashion
across the three panel surveys (Columns 2, 4, and 6), with the estimates that exclude the residual vs
dropping to 1.5 to 1.9 percent, and the estimates that include the residual vs dropping to 2.9 to 3.2
percent.
Panel B of Table 2 converts these variance fractions into the more easily interpreted average
impacts of a 10th-to-90th quantile shift in school/neighborhood environment. Recall that the sample
average college enrollment rate is 27 percent in NLS72, 31 percent in NELS88, and 37 percent in
ELS2002. Since more of the students are not close to the college attendance threshold in 1972,
fewer of them reach the decision margin for a given shift in school/neighborhood environment,
relative to the cohorts from later generations. Despite these differences in baseline enrollment rates,
the estimated lower bounds on the increase in the 4-year enrollment rate from moving every student
(one at a time) from the 10th to the 90th quantile school/neighborhood are fairly consistent across
generations. When the residual component vs is excluded and the full specification is considered,
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the estimates for each dataset are between 11 and 13 percentage points (Row 1, Columns 2, 4, and 6
of Panel B). Specifically, a 10th to 90th quantile shift in the school/neighborhood component Z2sG2
increases enrollment rates from 21.0% to 32.9% in NLS72, from 26.1% to 37.3% in NELS88, and
from 30.2% to 43.4% in ELS2002. Including the residual between-school component boosts the
range of estimates to 15 to 17 percentage points. Even 10th-to-50th quantile shifts still produce
average estimated impacts between 5 and 8 percentage points.
As with the estimates for high school graduation, the estimates in Table 2 suggest that schools
and neighborhoods also play an important role in determining who enrolls in a four-year college.
8.3 Heterogeneous Effects of 10th-90th Percentile Shifts in School Quality
The estimates reported in Panel B of Tables 1 and 2 are based on starting the full distribution of
students at a 10th quantile school and moving them to a 90th quantile school. However, many of the
students with superior background characteristics would be quite unlikely to ever be observed in a
10th quantile environment. A more realistic estimate might place greater weight on the individual-
specific estimates associated with the kinds of students most likely to be observed in 10th quantile
schools. While our method does not allow us to discern the quality of any given school, we can
nonetheless explore the extent to which the estimates in Tables 1 and 2 conceal heterogeneity in the
impact of moving schools across students with varying student backgrounds. Due to the nonlinearity
in the probit function that links Yi to the binary outcome indicators for high school graduation and
enrollment in a 4-year college, the sensitivity to school quality is higher for groups with values of
Xs,iBˆ that place them closer to a probability of .5. High school graduation is therefore more sensitive
to school quality for disadvantaged groups and less sensitive for advantaged groups. The opposite
tends to be true for enrollment in a four-year college.
Table 3 reports the lower bounds (excluding and including the school-level residual vs) for the
effect of a 10th to 90th percentile shift in school quality on graduation rates for two extreme cases:
students whose value of the background index XiBˆ places them at the 10th quantile of the XiBˆ
distribution (Rows 1 and 2), and students at the 90th quantile of the XiBˆ distribution (Rows 3 and
4). For the North Carolina sample and the full specification (Column 2), the lower bound estimates
that include the between-school residual component vs suggest a 22.9 percentage point increase for
students at the 10th quantile (43.2% to 66.1%) and a 6.3 percentage point increase for students at
the 90th quantile (90.8% to 96.2%), respectively. For NELS88 grade 8 (Column 4), the numbers are
smaller, particularly for the 90th quantile: lower bound estimates that include vs are 15.9 percentage
points (55.5 to 71.4) and 0.6 percentage points (99.0% to 99.7%). This partly reflects the fact that
the average dropout rate is lower for the NELS88 than for the state of North Carolina between
2007 and 2009. ELS2002 results are quite similar to those from NELS88. The results suggest
that advantaged students tend to graduate high school regardless of the school they attend, while
disadvantaged students are strongly affected by school quality.
Table 3 also reports the average impact of a 10th-90th shift on high school graduation rates
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for three subpopulations of interest: black students, white students with single mothers who did
not attend college, and white students with both parents present, at least one of whom completed
college. For the full specification in the North Carolina sample, the shift increases the predicted
graduation rate among black students from 68.4% to 83.6% (a net gain of 15.2 percentage points).
The corresponding increase for white students with single mothers who did not attend college is
20.6 percentage points (69.2% to 84.3%), while the increase for white students with both parents,
at least one of whom completed college, is 8.4 percentage points (86.3% to 94.6%). The estimated
increases in graduation rates are consistently smaller in the NELS88 and ELS samples, but are still
between 5 and 12 percentage points for black students and for white students with single mothers
who did not attend college.
Table 4 reports a corresponding set of results for enrollment in a 4-year college. The college
enrollment rates for students at the 10th percentile of the XiBˆ distribution are substantially less sen-
sitive to school quality, reflecting the fact that most such students are nowhere near the four year
college enrollment margin. For example, the ELS2002 estimate from the full specification sug-
gests that a 10th-90th shift in the school system/neighborhood component Var(Z2sG2 + vs) would
increase the four year enrollment rates of students at the 10th percentile of XiBˆ by 6.4 percentage
points (from 2.1% to 8.6%). More generally, the lower bound estimates that exclude and include the
residual vs are between 2.7 and 5.0 percentage points and between 3.4 and 6.4 percentage points,
respectively, depending on the dataset and specification. By contrast, for students at the 90th per-
centile of XiBˆ the ELS2002 estimate from the full specification suggests that a 10th-90th shift in the
school system/neighborhood component Var(Z2sG2 + vs) would increase enrollment rates at four
year colleges by 16.7 percentage points (from 72.8% to 89.6%). The lower bound estimates ex-
cluding and including common shocks for students at the 90th percentile of the XiBˆ distribution are
between 13 and 18 percentage points and 17 and 23 percentage points, respectively. The values for
blacks and for whites with non-college-educated single mothers are similar to the results for the full
sample, while the values for whites with college educated parents are close to those for the 90th
percentile of the XiBˆ distribution.
Overall, it appears that, except for the lowest stratum of student background, there are consider-
able pools of students that are close enough to the decision margin for a major shift in school quality
to be a deciding factor in determining enrollment in a four year college.
8.4 NLS Results for Years of Postsecondary Education and Permanent Log Wages
Table 5 displays the lower bound estimates of the impact of 10th-to-90th and 10th-to-50th shifts
in school quality on years of postsecondary education and permanent log wages for the NLS72
sample. The baseline lower bound estimate that excludes the between-school residual vs implies
that a 10-90 shift in school quality increases years of postsecondary education by .58 years, while
including standardized tests among the observable characteristics reduces this estimate to .44 years.
Note, though, that since the NLS72 data is collected in 12th grade, the standardized test scores are
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particularly likely to reflect high school quality, making the full specification a likely underestimate.
Adding the variance in the unexplained between-school component raises these estimates to .66 and
.52 years respectively. 10th-to-50th quantile shifts are half as large by construction, since no non-
linear transformation takes place when the outcome is continuous (the “latent” index is perfectly
revealed). Collectively, the estimates suggest a substantive impact of shifts in school quality on
years of college education.
Columns 3-6 contain analogous estimates for the permanent component of log wages. Columns
3-4 reflect specifications in which years of postsecondary education is not included as a control,
while columns 5-6 include years of postsecondary education to focus on the effect on log wages that
does not occur via postsecondary education. In practice, the two sets of estimates are quite similar.
The estimates that exclude the residual vs imply that a 10-90 shift in school quality increases wages
by around 17 percent. The 10-50 shifts are again half as large at around 8.5 percent. Estimates that
include vs imply that a 10-90 shift in school quality increases wages by around 19 percent. Thus,
at least for the 1972 cohort, shifts in school quality also seem to have important impacts for longer
run outcomes of prime importance for worker welfare.
9 Other Applications
The control function approach can also be applied to other situations in which selective sorting
into units makes identification of the independent effect of the units difficult. Measurement of
teacher quality is a particularly important application given the widespread use of teacher value
added models to aid in the evaluation of teachers. It is also an example of a set of problems in
which sorting into groups (classrooms in this case) is mediated by an administrator rather than the
result of individual choices.
Most of the analysis in Section 2 can be adapted easily to the administrator choice context. For
example, suppose that the school principal has already decided which teachers to allocate to which
courses for which periods of the day. A classroom c can also be characterized by a vector of amenity
values Ac. The amenities might include the principal’s perceptions of various teacher attributes or
skills as well as other amenities such as whether the heating system works and the difficulty level of
the class. The Θ and ΘU matrices that relate preferences for different elements of Ac to Xi and XUi
will now reflect a principal’s belief about which types of students are most likely to benefit from a
better teacher, the difficulty level, etc. They might also reflect a desire to placate parents or students,
where students/parents with certain values of Xi or XUi are more likely to advocate for particular
classroom assignments.
When the amenity vector Ac is taken to be exogenous to the principal’s choice (i.e. indepen-
dent of classroom composition), the solution to the classroom allocation problem aligns with that
of a competitive equilibrium. In Appendix Section A9, we show that in this case the unobserved
classroom averages XUc will be a linear function of the observed averages Xc under assumptions anal-
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ogous to those in Proposition 1. Exogeneity of the amenity vector may be reasonable in some high
school and college contexts in which students submit course preferences and a schedule-making
algorithm assigns students to classrooms.
However, in the elementary and middle school contexts, it seems likely that some elements of
Ac could reflect the student makeup of the class. In such contexts the classroom sorting problem
diverges from the school/neighborhood sorting problem in two important respects. First, the prin-
cipal may care directly about inequality across classes in average student characteristics. Second,
the principal would internalize the effect that allocating a student to a classroom c has on the class-
room’s composition-dependent amenities Ac, whereas parents take the school amenities As as given.
We have not yet solved a planning problem featuring endogenous amenities.
Nevertheless, our analysis of the exogenous amenities case does suggest that the common prac-
tice of including classroom averages of student characteristics (such as in Chetty et al. (2014))
may play a potentially powerful role in purging value-added estimates of biases stemming from
non-random student sorting on unobservables and observables. Furthermore, as we note in the
Appendix, it may also reduce omitted variables bias from non-random assignment of teachers to
other unobserved outcome-relevant classroom environmental factors such as track or time of day.
While there are many caveats to our analysis, it may partially explain the otherwise surprising find-
ing that non-experimental OLS estimators of teacher quality produce nearly unbiased estimates of
true teacher quality as ascertained by quasi-experimental and experimental estimates (Chetty et al.
(2014), Kane and Staiger (2008)).
We also mentioned the evaluation of hospitals and hospital inputs in the introduction. Recent
work by Fletcher et al. (2014) uses patient data matched to physicians to estimate the effects of
physicians on health outcomes. It controls for very detailed patient characteristics but not for the
physician-specific averages of patient characteristics. Our analysis suggests that adding these would
allay concerns about sorting on patient unobservables.
Finally, a very different type of application of our approach relates to government regula-
tion. The standard textbook treatment of occupational safety regulation (e.g. Ehrenberg and Smith
(2010)) suggests that government intervention only increases worker welfare if the safety risks are
unknown at the time the occupation is chosen. Otherwise such regulations remove the opportunity
for risk-loving workers to get paid welfare-enhancing compensating differentials for taking on risky
jobs. The sorting model we presented suggests that the residual from a regression of occupation-
average age at death on a large vector of occupation-average worker characteristics can potentially
isolate the part of the long run occupational contribution to health that was unknown to workers
when they chose the occupation. It addresses the concern that occupational sorting on unobserved
characteristics that influence mortality is responsible for differences in mortality rates across occu-
pations. Thus, one can directly identify the occupations that merit government-supported informa-
tion campaigns or other safety regulations.
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10 Concluding Remarks
The key takeaway from the empirical analysis is that even conservative estimates of the contribu-
tion of schools and surrounding neighborhoods to later outcomes suggest that improving school/neighborhood
environments could have a large impact on high school graduation rates and college enrollment
rates. As we noted in the introduction, prior evidence on this topic is mixed, in part because prior
research showing substantial across-school and across-neighborhood variation in outcomes is sub-
ject to concerns about sorting on unobservables that we address in this paper. Our results are quite
consistent with the lottery-based estimates of Deming et al. (2014). They suggest that their results
might generalize beyond the specific high poverty Charlotte context they consider. Much more
speculatively, their results, perhaps combined with the Moving to Opportunity results, suggest that
schools may constitute a more important part of the contribution of the external environment than
do neighborhoods, though the two may be complementary.
There is a long research agenda. On the empirical side, we have discussed a number of other
applications for our approach to distinguishing true group effects from sorting. On the theoretical
side, there are clearly extensions to our framework that are likely to produce a more nuanced in-
terpretation. In particular, our model of outcomes does not explicitly allow for complementarities
and other interactions between school and student quality.34 For example, it could be the case that
the types of students who attend low quality schools are those who are most likely to profit from
improvements in school quality. Additional monte carlo analysis is needed to better understand the
conditions under which the approach works well in delivering a lower bound. We are currently
extending the theoretical analysis around Proposition 1 to the case when the number of choices is
discrete rather than continuous, although the simulations reported in the paper make clear that the
control function approach works well in that case. We view the central message of our paper to
be that in many circumstances aspects of the distribution of the group averages of observed indi-
vidual characteristics are likely to be a useful control for group averages of unobserved individual
characteristics, not that the relationship between the observed and unobserved group averages is
necessarily linear.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Lower Bound Estimates of the Contribution of School Systems and Neighborhoods to
High School Graduation Decisions
Panel A: Fraction of Latent Index Variance Determining Graduation
Attributable to School/Neighborhood Quality
Lower Bound NC NELS88 gr8 ELS2002
Baseline Full Baseline Full Baseline Full
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LB no unobs 0.018 0.013 0.011 0.006 0.025 0.024
Var(Z2sG2) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.012) (0.011)
LB w/ unobs 0.049 0.036 0.028 0.016 0.036 0.025
Var(Z2sG2 + vs) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.012) (0.011)
Panel B: Effect on Graduation Probability of a School System/Neighborhood at
the 50th or 90th Percentile of the Quality Distribution vs. the 10th Percentile
Lower Bound NC NELS88 gr8 ELS2002
Baseline Full Baseline Full Baseline Full
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LB no unobs: 10th-90th 0.106 0.084 0.061 0.047 0.070 0.068
Based on Var(Z2sG2) (0.022) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
LB w/ unobs: 10th-90th 0.174 0.152 0.098 0.075 0.083 0.070
Based on Var(Z2sG2 + vs) (0.026) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
LB no unobs: 10th-50th 0.056 0.044 0.033 0.025 0.040 0.038
Based on Var(Z2sG2) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008)
LB w/ unobs: 10th-50th 0.096 0.083 0.055 0.041 0.048 0.039
Based on Var(Z2sG2 + vs) (0.016) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Bootstrap standard errors based on resampling at the school level are in parentheses.
Panel A reports lower bound estimates of the fraction of variance in the latent index that determines
high school graduation that can be directly attributed to school/neighborhood choices for each dataset.
The row labelled “LB no unobs” reports Var(Z2sG2) and excludes the unobservable vs while the row
labeled “LB w/ unobs” reports Var(Z2sG2 + vs).
Panel B reports estimates of the average effect of moving students from a school/neighborhood at the
10th quantile of the quality distribution to one at the 50th or 90th quantile.
The columns headed “NC” are based on the North Carolina data and refer to a decomposition that
uses the 9th grade school as the group variable. The columns headed “NELS88 gr8” are based on the
NELS88 sample and refer to a decomposition that uses the 8th grade school as the group variable. The
columns headed “ELS2002” are based on the ELS2002 sample and refer to a decomposition that uses
the 10th grade school as the group variable.
For each data set the variables in the baseline model and the full model are specified in Web Appendix
Tables A5 - A8.
The full variance decompositions underlying these estimates are presented in Web Appendix Table
A9.
Appendix Sections 5 and 6 discuss estimation of model parameters and the variance decompositions.
Section 6.3 discusses estimation of the 10-50 and 10-90 differentials.
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Table 2: Lower Bound Estimates of the Contribution of School Systems and Neighborhoods to
Four Year College Enrollment Decisions
Panel A: Fraction of Latent Index Variance Determining Enrollment
Attributable to School/Neighborhood Quality
Lower Bound NLS72 NELS88 gr8 ELS2002
Baseline Full Baseline Full Baseline Full
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LB no unobs 0.026 0.019 0.018 0.015 0.022 0.018
Var(Z2sG2) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006)
LB w/ unobs 0.038 0.032 0.040 0.029 0.046 0.031
Var(Z2sG2 + vs) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007)
Panel B: Effect on Enrollment Probability of a School System/Neighborhood at
the 50th or 90th Percentile of the Quality Distribution vs. the 10th Percentile
Lower Bound NLS72 NELS88 gr8 ELS2002
Baseline Full Baseline Full Baseline Full
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LB no unobs: 10th-90th 0.139 0.118 0.127 0.112 0.155 0.132
Based on Var(Z2sG2) (0.013) (0.012) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017)
LB w/ unobs: 10th-90th 0.170 0.152 0.188 0.155 0.216 0.172
Based on Var(Z2sG2 + vs) (0.017) (0.016) (0.020) (0.018) (0.021) (0.020)
LB no unobs: 10th-50th 0.065 0.056 0.061 0.054 0.075 0.064
Based on Var(Z2sG2) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
LB w/ unobs: 10th-50th 0.078 0.071 0.088 0.073 0.103 0.083
Based on Var(Z2sG2 + vs) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Bootstrap standard errors based on resampling at the school level are in parentheses.
The notes to Table 1 apply, except that Table 2 reports results for enrollment in a 4-year college two
years after graduation.
The column headed NLS72 refers to a variance decomposition that uses the 12th grade school as the
group variable.
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Table 3: The Impact of 10th-90th Percentile Shifts in School Quality on High School Graduation
Rates for Selected Subpopulations
NC NELS88 gr8 ELS2002
Subpopulation Baseline Full Baseline Full Baseline Full
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
XB: 10th Quantile
LB no unobs 0.146 0.127 0.110 0.099 0.123 0.140
Based on Var(Z2sG2) (0.030) (0.020) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025)
LB w/ unobs 0.242 0.229 0.176 0.159 0.146 0.144
Based on Var(Z2sG2 + vs) (0.035) (0.024) (0.031) (0.027) (0.024) (0.025)
XB: 90th Quantile
LB no unobs 0.060 0.036 0.016 0.004 0.019 0.010
Based on Var(Z2sG2) (0.013) (0.006) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002)
LB w/ unobs 0.098 0.063 0.026 0.006 0.022 0.010
Based on Var(Z2sG2 + vs) (0.016) (0.008) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002)
Black
LB no unobs 0.107 0.085 0.061 0.053 0.079 0.082
Based on Var(Z2sG2) (0.022) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
LB w/ unobs 0.176 0.152 0.098 0.084 0.094 0.084
Based on Var(Z2sG2 + vs) (0.026) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014)
White w/ Single Mother
Who Did Not Attend College
LB no unobs 0.142 0.114 0.099 0.078 0.101 0.096
Based on Var(Z2sG2) (0.029) (0.019) (0.023) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020)
LB w/ unobs 0.235 0.206 0.159 0.125 0.120 0.099
Based on Var(Z2sG2 + vs) (0.034) (0.022) (0.028) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020)
White w/ Both Parents,
At Least One Completed College
LB no unobs 0.062 0.047 0.025 0.016 0.032 0.016
Based on Var(Z2sG2) (0.014) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
LB w/ unobs 0.102 0.084 0.040 0.025 0.037 0.016
Based on Var(Z2sG2 + vs) (0.016) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Bootstrap standard errors based on re-sampling at the school level are in parentheses.
The table reports the average effect for the subpopulation indicated by the row heading of moving
students from a school/neighborhood at the 10th quantile of the quality distribution to one at the 90th
quantile.
“XB: 10th Quantile” and “XB: 90th Quantile” refer to students whose values of XsiB is equal the
estimated 10th (90th) quantile value of the XsiB distribution. See Section 8.3.
See the notes to Table 1 for row and column definitions
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Table 4: The Impact of 10th-90th Percentile Shifts in School Quality on Four-Year College
Enrollment Rates for Selected Subpopulations
NLS72 NELS88 gr8 ELS2002
Subpopulation Baseline Full Baseline Full Baseline Full
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
XB: 10th Quantile
LB no unobs 0.078 0.027 0.064 0.032 0.100 0.050
Based on Var(Z2sG2) (0.008) (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.013) (0.007)
LB w/ unobs 0.094 0.034 0.093 0.046 0.138 0.064
Based on Var(Z2sG2 + vs) (0.010) (0.005) (0.011) (0.006) (0.015) (0.008)
XB: 90th Quantile
LB no unobs 0.191 0.182 0.160 0.128 0.166 0.128
Based on Var(Z2sG2) (0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.017)
LB w/ unobs 0.234 0.234 0.236 0.187 0.231 0.167
Based on Var(Z2sG2 + vs) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.022) (0.023) (0.017)
Black
LB no unobs 0.132 0.109 0.125 0.111 0.145 0.121
Based on Var(Z2sG2) (0.013) (0.012) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016)
LB w/ unobs 0.161 0.140 0.184 0.152 0.201 0.158
Based on Var(Z2sG2 + vs) (0.017) (0.016) (0.019) (0.017) (0.020) (0.018)
White w/ Single Mother
Who Did Not Attend College
LB no unobs 0.110 0.099 0.091 0.074 0.140 0.124
Based on Var(Z2sG2) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.018) (0.016)
LB w/ unobs 0.134 0.127 0.132 0.102 0.195 0.162
Based on Var(Z2sG2 + vs) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.020) (0.019)
White w/ Both Parents,
At Least One Completed College
LB no unobs 0.180 0.158 0.157 0.139 0.173 0.148
Based on Var(Z2sG2) (0.016) (0.015) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020)
LB w/ unobs 0.220 0.204 0.232 0.192 0.242 0.193
Based on Var(Z2sG2 + vs) (0.022) (0.021) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
Bootstrap standard errors based on resampling at the school level are in parentheses.
The notes to Table 3 apply, except that Table 4 reports results for enrollment in a 4 year college 2 years
after graduation, and the NLS72 is one of the data sets.
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Table 5: Lower Bound Estimates of the Contribution of School Systems and Neighborhoods to
Completed Years of Postsecondary Education and Permanent Wages (NLS72 data)
Panel A: Fraction of Variance
Attributable to School/Neighborhood Quality
Lower Bound Yrs. Postsec. Ed.
Perm. Wages Perm. Wages
No Post-sec Ed. w/ Post-sec Ed.
Baseline Full Baseline Full Baseline Full
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LB no unobs 0.026 0.019 0.018 0.015 0.022 0.018
Var(Z2sG2) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
LB w/ unobs 0.038 0.032 0.040 0.029 0.046 0.031
Var(Z2sG2 + vs) (0.004) (0.002) (0.013) (0.016) (0.021) (0.021)
Panel B: Effects on Years of Postsecondary Education and Permanent Wages
of a School System/Neighborhood at the 50th or 90th Percentile
of the Quality Distribution vs. the 10th Percentile
Lower Bound Yrs. Postsec. Ed.
Perm. Wages Perm. Wages
No Post-sec Ed. w/ Post-sec Ed.
Baseline Full Baseline Full Baseline Full
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LB no unobs: 10th-90th 0.578 0.445 0.152 0.157 0.155 0.157
Based on Var(Z2sG2) (0.054) (0.039) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
LB w/unobs: 10th-90th 0.661 0.520 0.177 0.177 0.175 0.173
Based on Var(Z2sG2 + vs) (0.069) (0.047) (0.028) (0.023) (0.031) (0.031)
LB no unobs: 10th-50th 0.283 0.222 0.076 0.079 0.077 0.078
Based on Var(Z2sG2) (0.027) (0.019) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
LB w/unobs: 10th-50th 0.331 0.260 0.088 0.088 0.087 0.087
Based on Var(Z2sG2 + vs) (0.035) (0.024) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016)
Bootstrap standard errors based on resampling at the school level are in parentheses.
Panel A of Table 5 reports lower bound estimates of the fraction of variance of years of
postsecondary education and permanent wage rates (with and without controls for postsec-
ondary education) that can be directly attributed to school/neighborhood choices for each
dataset. The sample is NLS72.
The row labelled “LB no unobs” reports Var(Z2sG2) and excludes the unobservable vs
while the row labeled “LB w/ unobs” reports Var(Z2sG2 + vs).
Panel B reports estimates of the average effect of moving students from a
school/neighborhood at the 10th quantile of the quality distribution to one at the 50th
or 90th quantile. It is equal to 2 ∗ 1.28 times the value of [V̂ar(Z2sG2 + vs)]0.5 or
[V̂ar(Z2sG2)]0.5 in the corresponding column of the table.
See Web Appendix Table A5 for the variables in the baseline model and the full model.
The full variance decompositions are in Appendix Table A10. Web Appendix Sections 5
and 6 discuss estimation of model parameters and the variance decompositions.
39
Appendix: For Online Publication Only
A1 Spanning Condition Examples
Consider first a scenario in which there are two observed student characteristics X ≡ [X1,X2], two
outcome-relevant unobserved student characteristics XU = [XU1 ,X
U
2 ], and two school/neighborhood
amenity factors, A = [A1,A2].
Case 1: rank(ΘU)≤ rank(Θ) = dim(A)
Suppose that the matrices capturing the impact of observed unobserved student characteristics
on parent WTP for amenities Θ and ΘU are each full rank. For example:
Θ=
{
1 1
0 1
}
ΘU =
{
1 2
2 1
}
Then we can write ΘU = RΘ, where
R =
{
1 1
2 −1
}
Thus, the spanning condition is satisfied in this case. If ΘU were rank-deficient, then the spanning
condition would still be satisfied, but R would be rank-deficient.
Now suppose that there are instead three outcome-relevant unobserved characteristics: XU =
[XU1 ,X
U
2 ,X
U
3 ], each of which affects WTP for the two amenities differentially. Suppose that X and
Θ are unchanged from Case 1:
Θ=
{
1 1
0 1
}
ΘU =

1 2
2 1
1 1

Then we can write ΘU = RΘ, where
R =

1 1
2 −1
1 0

Thus, the spanning condition is satisfied in this case. We see that dim(X) can be less than dim(XU)
without violating the spanning condition, as long as the row rank of Θ is at least as large as the
row rank of ΘU . Any scenario satisfying rank(ΘU) ≤ rank(Θ) = dim(A) will satisfy the spanning
condition in Proposition 1.
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Case 2: rank(Θ)< rank(ΘU)≤ dim(A)
Suppose instead that neither X1 nor X2 predicts willingness to pay for A2:
Θ=
{
1 0
2 0
}
ΘU =
{
1 2
2 1
}
Since Θ is now rank-deficient, there is no matrix R such that RΘ=ΘU . In particular, for any matrix
R, each entry in column 2 will always be zero, but the second column of ΘU contains non-zero
entries. Similarly, if both X1 and X2 affect WTP for A1 and A2 in the same proportion, a rank-
deficiency will also occur:
Θ=
{
1 2
2 4
}
.
Here, an incremental unit of X1 or X2 will affect WTP for A2 by twice as much as it will affect WTP
for A1. As in the previous example, there is no matrix R such that RΘ=ΘU . For any choice of R, in
each row of RΘ the second column will always be twice as large as the first column, but the second
row of ΘU has a first column entry that is only half as large as its second column entry. Both these
examples violate the spanning condition. If the row rank of Θ is less than the row rank of ΘU , then
the row space of ΘU cannot possibly be a subspace of the row space of Θ.
Case 3: rank(ΘU)≤ rank(Θ)< dim(A)
Suppose now that both X and XU are scalars: X ≡ X1, XU ≡ XU1 . Consider first the case where
X1 only predicts WTP for A1, while XU1 only predicts WTP for A2:
Θ=
{
1 0
}
ΘU =
{
0 1
}
Regardless of the 1x1 scalar R, the product RΘ will have a zero in the second column, which does
not match ΘU . Despite the fact that rank(Θ) = rank(ΘU) = 1, the spanning condition fails because
the row space of ΘU is not a subspace of the row space of Θ.
Indeed, suppose that we alter Θ and ΘU so that both X1 and XU1 affect willingness to pay for
both amenities (but in different proportions):
Θ=
{
1 1
}
ΘU =
{
2 4
}
There is no scalar R such that RΘ = ΘU , since any value of R will preserve the one-to-one ratio
between the first and second entries in Θ, while ΘU has a one-to-two ratio between its first and
second entries. The spanning condition also fails in this case because the row space of ΘU is not a
subspace of the row space of Θ. This example demonstrates that if the set of factors that individuals
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consider when choosing groups is large, one will generally need an equally large set of observable
characteristics in order to satisfy the spanning condition in Proposition 1.
Finally, suppose that both X1 and XU1 only affect willingness to pay for A1 (κ may affect taste
for A2, so that A2 is still relevant for school choice):
Θ=
{
1 0
}
ΘU =
{
2 0
}
Then for R = 2, RΘ = ΘU , and the spanning condition is satisfied. Note that the row space of Θ is
a subspace of the row space of ΘU , despite the fact that both Θ and ΘU are rank deficient. This last
example illustrates that the observed characteristics need not predict WTP for all choice-relevant
amenities as long as the rows ofΘ span the same (or a superspace) of the amenity subspace spanned
by the rows of ΘU .
A2 Testing Proposition 1: Does Xs Span the Amenity Space?
As discussed in Section 3.1.2, one of the key necessary conditions for Proposition 1 to hold is
that the vector of observables Xi captures enough independent factors determining families’ prefer-
ences over group amenities that it can span the space of amenities for which these observables affect
tastes (denoted AXs ). Under the particular linear specification of utility featured in 2, this condition
is tantamount to requiring that rank(δ )≥ dim(AXs ).
Note that equation 11 implies that Xs can be written as a linear combination of the gradient
of equilibrium neighborhood prices with respect to amenities: Xs = ∇P(As(i)) ∗Ω, where Ω =
Var(γ i)−1δ˜
′
Var(Xi). If the condition rank(δ )≥ dim(AXs ) is strictly satisfied, then the LO elements of
Xs are all linear combinations of a smaller number g of price gradient components. But this implies
that Cov(Xs) will be rank deficient, with rank(Cov(Xs)) = dim(AXs ). This is a testable prediction.
More generally, suppose Proposition 1 is nearly satisfied, so that small number of amenity fac-
tors drive the vast majority of the variation in Xs, but there are several other amenities for which
elements of Xi slightly influence taste. Our simulations in section 4 suggest that such minor depar-
tures from the necessary conditions laid out in Proposition 1 have very little impact on the ability of
Xs effectively control for the unobservable between-school variation XUs . In such contexts, a small
number of amenity factors should account for a very large fraction of the variation in Xs, with only
a very small amount of unexplained residual variation.
We test these predictions by performing principal components analysis (PCA) on Xs. Because
the sample school averages of observable characteristics X s are noisy measures of the expected
values Xs ≡ E[Xi|s(i) = s, we do not fit the PCA model to X s directly. Instead, we estimate the
underlying true covariance matrix Cov(Xs)35, and then directly perform the principal components
35Specifically, we estimate ˆCov(Xi) and ˆCov(Xi−Xs) by taking the sample (weighted) covariances of Xi and Xi− Xˆ s,
performing the requisite degrees-of-freedom adjustment, and then obtaining ˆCov(Xs) via ˆCov(Xs) = ˆCov(Xi)− ˆCov(Xi−
Xs).
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analysis on the estimated covariance matrix.
In Appendix Table A1 we present the results of this exercise. Panel A provides, for each dataset
we use, the number of principal components necessary to explain 75%, 90%, 95%, 99%, and 100%
of the sum of the variances of the standardized values of the LO characteristics in Xs (∑L
O
l Var(Xsl),
respectively. This is the standard output from a factor analysis. In Panel B, we also provide the
number of principal components necessary to explain 75%, 90%, 95%, 99%, and 100% of the
variance in XsGˆ1, the regression index formed by using the estimated coefficients on school-level
averages from our empirical analysis.
Both Panel A and Panel B provide strong evidence that rank(δ ) ≥ dim(AXs ), implying that the
first necessary condition for the spanning condition δ˜ = RδU in Proposition 1 is satisfied in the
datasets we use. Specifically, in each dataset, Cov(Xs) is found to be rank deficient. For example, in
the full specification using ELS2002, only 33 latent factors are needed to explain all of the variance
in Xs (Panel A, Row 6, Column 6), compared to LO = 51 elements of Xs. Similarly, in the NELS88
full specification, only 32 factors fully explain the variance in the 49 factors of Xs.
Furthermore, the PCA analysis also suggests that a much smaller number of factors can account
for the vast majority of the variation in either ∑L
O
l Var(Xsl or Var(XsGˆ1). In the ELS2002 full
specification, only 19 and 11 factors are needed to explain 95% of the variation in ∑L
O
l Var(Xsl and
Var(XsGˆ1), respectively (Panels A and B, Row 4, Column 6). For NELS88, only 20 and 13 factors
are needed to explain 95% of the variation in the corresponding two measures (Panels A and B,
Row 4, Column 4).
Note, though, that our principal components analysis does not inform us about the second nec-
essary condition for Xs to effectively control for XUs : for each component of X
U
i , either there must
exist an element of the observed vector Xi that is correlated with this unobservable, or the set of
amenities for which it shifts preferences must also be a subset of the amenities for which elements
of Xi shift preferences (AX
U
s ⊂ AXs ). As mentioned in Section 3.1.2, we believe that the richness and
size of the set of observables used in our datasets make this second necessary condition plausible.
A3 Solving for the Equilibrium Allocation
In this section we further explore the relationship student characteristics, school choices, and
school and neighborhood amenities by explicitly solving the model from Section 2 for the equilib-
rium allocation of families across schools under somewhat stronger assumptions.
First, we assume that the joint distribution of [X ,XU ,κ] and the joint distribution of As are both
multivariate normal. Second, we assume that As does not depend on which families choose s (i.e.
the elements of As do not depend on directly on Xs or on Xus ). This is a restrictive assumption in
the school choice setting, but may be quite plausible in other settings (e.g. differentiated product
choice).36 We continue to assume that families freely choose locations subject to P(As). This
36Neither of these assumptions are required for Proposition 1 and so are not necessary to justify the use of school
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enables us to exploit the second welfare theorem result that any proposed allocation must be an
equilibrium allocation if it satisfies the following two conditions: (a) the allocation is feasible, and
(b) the allocation is pareto efficient.
Recall that when εis is excluded from the model, any vectors [X ,XU ,κ] sharing the same value
of the index vector λ will feature the same willingness to pay for all possible neighborhoods. As a
result, the exact school assignment for a particular vector of characteristics [Xi,XUi ,κi] conditional
on λi carries no welfare implications, which creates an infinite number of equilibrium allocations.
Consequently, we focus on how values of λi get mapped to amenity vectors A in equilibrium (which
we call “λ -allocations”).
We restrict attention to linear λ -allocations of the form A = Ψλ ′, where Ψ is a K×K matrix,
and we proceed to show that there is a unique matrix Ψ that satisfies both feasibility and pareto
efficiency.37
Consider first the feasibility requirement: demand for each value of amenity vector A1, . . . ,AK
generated by the proposed λ -allocation must equal supply. In our continuous context, feasibility
means that the distributions of amenity vectors supplied and demanded coincide. Let Σλ ′i denote the
covariance matrix of the joint distribution of the K-vector λ ′i in the population, and let ΣA denote
the covariance matrix of the joint distribution of the K-vector As(i) in the population, where the de-
pendence on i indicates that we are considering the distribution that weights amenity combinations
by the number of student slots. The overall capacity across all schools/neighborhoods is assumed to
match the number of students, which in the continuous case means that the densities of [X ,XU ,κ]
and A integrate to the same value, which we normalize to 1. Since the amenity vector demanded
by a student with index λi in our proposed equilibrium is Ψλ ′i , our feasibility requirement can be
written as:
ΣA =Var(Ψλ ′) =ΨΣλ ′Ψ′ (36)
Thus, feasibility requires that ΣA and Σλ ′ be made congruent by the allocation matrix Ψ. Since
both ΣA and Σλ ′ are full rank variance matrices, both are positive definite.38 Any pair of positive
definite matrices is known to be congruent to infinitely many matrices (there are infinitely many
market-clearing ways to assign students to schools).
Now consider the pareto efficiency requirement. Since P(A) is a transfer, and we assume that
schools/landowners do not have preferences over families, requiring that the allocation S be pareto
efficient is equivalent to requiring that there are no possible exchanges of neighborhoods between
any pair of families that would make both families at least as well off and at least one family strictly
better off.
average observable characteristics as a control function for school average unobservable characteristics.
37We have not yet proven but strongly suspect that the linear allocation represents the unique equilibrium λ -allocations
when non-linear λ -allocations are also considered. Gretsky et al. (1992) has already proven the existence of an equilib-
rium for a class of games that includes our model.
38If either ΣA or Σλ ′ were rank deficient, we could redefine the amenity factors to be a smaller number of linear
combinations of the original K amenity factors.
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Given a common price function P(A) across families, such mutually beneficial exchanges will
only exist if each family places a relatively higher valuation on the other family’s chosen school
than their own. Given that our money-metric utility function can be written as λ ′A and the proposed
λ -allocation A =Ψλ ′, a mutually beneficial exchange between families with the vectors λ1 and λ2
will exist iff λ1Ψλ ′1−λ1Ψλ ′2 < λ2Ψλ ′1−λ2Ψλ ′2. Thus, ruling out such exchanges requires:
λ1Ψλ ′1−λ1Ψλ ′2 ≥ λ2Ψλ ′1−λ2Ψλ ′2 ∀ (λ1,λ2) ∈RKxRK (37)
But this equation can be reformulated as follows:
λ1Ψλ ′1−λ1Ψλ ′2 ≥ λ2Ψλ ′1−λ2Ψλ ′2 ∀ (λ1,λ2) ∈RKxRK
⇒ (λ1−λ2)Ψλ ′1− (λ1−λ2)Ψλ ′2 ≥ 0 ∀ (λ1,λ2) ∈RKxRK
⇒ (λ1−λ2)Ψ(λ1−λ2)′ ≥ 0 ∀ (λ1,λ2) ∈RKxRK
⇒ λ˜Ψλ˜ ′ ≥ 0 ∀λ˜ ∈RK (38)
where λ˜ is defined to be the difference between two arbitrarily chosen row vectors λ1 and λ2.
Equation 38 makes reveals that pareto efficiency requiresΨ to be a positive semi-definite or positive
definite matrix. But a matrix Ψ that was merely positive semi-definite would be rank deficient, and
would violate feasibility, since rank(ΨΣλ ′Ψ′) ≤ rank(Ψ) < rank(ΣA). Thus, Ψ must be positive
definite. But two positive definite matrices (in our case Σλ ′ and ΣA) are made congruent by a unique
positive definite matrix Lawson and Lim (2006):
Ψ= Σ−1/2λ ′ (Σ
1/2
λ ′ ΣAΣ
1/2
λ ′ )Σ
−1/2
λ ′ (39)
Thus, since the matrix Ψ is the unique matrix satisfying both the pareto efficiency and feasibility
requirements, it is the unique (linear) equilibrium λ -allocation.
Furthermore, since every positive definite matrix is invertible, we can also express the vector λi
for any individual as a linear function of the amenity vector of their chosen school:
λi = (Ψ−1As(i))′.
To characterize the equilibrium price function, P(A), note that from (4) ∇P(Asi) = λ ′i . Sub-
stituting for λ ′i using the above equation for the equilibrium relationship between λi and As(i), we
obtain:
∇P(Asi) =Ψ
−1As(i) (40)
The general solution to this linear first order partial differential equation is the following quadratic
form:
P(A) = 0.5A′Ψ−1A+ c, for any c ∈R (41)
Furthermore, since Ψ−1 is the inverse of a positive definite function, it is also positive definite. And
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since the positive definite Ψ−1 represents the Hessian of the equilibrium price function, P(A) must
be strictly convex, as previously supposed.
A4 Monte Carlo Simulations Exploring Finite-Sample Properties
This section describes a set of monte carlo simulations designed to explore the finite-sample
properties of our control function estimator across a number of key dimensions. As discussed in
section 4, a full characterization of these finite-sample properties is not feasible, so we focus on a
stylized test case that is rich enough to reveal the strengths and weaknesses of our approach. Section
A4.1 lays out the simulation methodology, while Section A4.2 presents and interprets the results.
A4.1 Methodology
The stylized test case we consider is one in which:
1. The elements of [Xi,XUi ,κi] are jointly normally distributed; the elements of κ are indepen-
dent of each other and [Xi,XUi ], while each pair of characteristics in [Xi,X
U
i ] features a .25
correlation39.
2. The latent amenity vectors As are normally distributed with a .25 correlation between any pair
of amenities across schools.
3. The matrices of taste parameters Θk` and ΘU represent draws from a multivariate normal
distribution in which corr(Θk`,Θ jm) = ρ if j = k or `= m, and 0 otherwise.
4. The variances of the elements of As, [Xi,XUi ,κi], εi,s are chosen to create interclass correlations
for Xi and XUi of between .1 and .25 across specifications. These values are in line with the
range observed across the datasets used in the empirical analysis.
Our test case implies considerable sorting into schools along many dimensions of school ameni-
ties and along many observable and unobservable dimensions of student quality. It represents
a conservative case because one might expect that in reality a few key observable (and unob-
servable) individual level factors (e.g. parental income, education, and wealth) and a few key
school/neighborhood amenities (ethnic composition, crime, principal quality) drive most of the sys-
tematic sorting of students to schools. Given restrictions 1-4, we complete the model by choosing
particular sets of 7 remaining parameters. The first parameter is students per school. For sim-
plicity, we impose that each school has capacity equal to this student/school ratio.40 The stu-
dent/school ratio is denoted “# Stu” in Appendix Table A2. The second parameter is the total
number school/neighborhood combinations available (denoted “# Sch”).
39This is the average correlation between observed continuous student-level characteristics in ELS2002.
40We believe that this is essentially without loss of generality. Without a finite elasticity of supply of land/school
vacancies though, it is hard to avoid having tiny school sizes in locations with low values of amenities that tend to be
highly desired. Fixed costs would prevent this.
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The parameter #Con is the number of schools in the consideration set for each household. This
captures the possibility that most parents only realistically consider a limited number of possible
locations. We implement this by distributing schools uniformly throughout the unit square, and
drawing a random latitude/longitude combination for each household. The households then consider
the preset number of schools that are closest to their location. Thus, consideration sets of different
households are overlapping.
The fourth and fifth parameters (denoted “# Ob.” and “# Un.”) specify the number of observed
and unobserved student characteristics that affect outcomes. The sixth parameter is the dimension
of the amenity vector over which households have preferences. In most of the specifications we
assume that it less then or equal to the number of observed characteristics and that the rows of ΘU
form a linear subspace of the rows of Θ˜, as required by Proposition 1.
The seventh parameter determines ρ , the correlation between any pair of random variables
(Θk`,Θ jm) from which each (Θk`,Θ jm is a draw. If ρ is high, then student characteristics that
predict a high willingness to pay for one amenity factor will also predict a high willingness to pay
for other amenity factors, and amenity factors that are strongly weighted by one characteristic are
likely to be strongly weighted by other characteristics (i.e. WTP for some amenity factors may
generally be sensitive to student characteristics).
In addition, we also consider four additional specifications that illustrate the degree to which our
control function approach is robust to various failures of the spanning condition from Proposition 1
(i.e. cases in which ΘU 6= RΘ˜ for any R).
Our measure of control function effectiveness, denoted “R-sq (All)”, is the R-squared from a
regression of the total contribution of school-averages of unobservable characteristics (XUs βU) to
each school’s average outcome (which captures the potential bias from unobservable sorting) on the
full vector of school-averages of observed characteristic, Xs. The R-squared should converge to 1
as the number of students per school gets large. However, the rate at which it does so is important
for the efficacy of the control function approach.
We also present the R-squared values calculated when random samples of 10, 20, or 40 students
from each school are used to calculate the school averages X s that compose the control function
(these values are denoted “R-sq (10)”, “R-sq (20)”, and “R-sq (40)”, respectively, in our tables).
We draw Xi, XUi , κi, and {εis} from the distributions described above to calculate the WTP of
each household for each school.41 Since our method does not require observation of the equilibrium
price function P(A), rather than iterating on an excess demand function to find the equilibrium
matching, we instead exploit the fact that a perfectly competitive market will always lead to a pareto
efficient allocation. The problem of allocating students to schools to maximize total consumer
surplus can be written as a linear programming problem, and solved quickly at relatively large scale
41To minimize the statistical “chatter” introduced by the particular Θ˜ matrix that we happened to draw, we drew ten
different Θ˜matrices from the prescribed distribution, ran the simulations for each parameter set for each of these matrices,
and then averaged the results across the ten iterations within each parameter set.
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using the simplex method combined with sparse matrix techniques. 42
A4.2 Simulation Results
The simulation results are presented in Appendix Table A2. Row (1) presents the base parame-
ter set to which other parameter sets will be compared. It features 1000 students per school and 50
schools in the area, all of which are considered by each family when the school choice is made. It
also features 10 amenities, 10 observable student characteristics, and 10 unobservable student char-
acteristics. The variances of these characteristics are all identical, so that sorting on unobservables
is as strong as sorting on observables. This is probably a conservative choice. Finally, the correla-
tion ρ between the random variables of which the taste weight matrices Θ and ΘU are multivariate
draws is assumed to be .25.
The first takeaway from Row (1) is that the control function approach is effective even with
reasonably-sized schools of 1000 students each (most of the schools in the North Carolina sample
enroll between 250 and 2000 students) and a moderate number of available schools: 97 percent of
the variance in the school-level contribution of unobserved student characteristics can be predicted
by a linear combination of school-average observable characteristics (Column 8).43
The second insight revealed by Row (1) is that the performance of the control function may
suffer when estimation is based on small subsamples of students at each school. We see that the
R-squared falls from .972 to only .368 when school averages are merely approximated based on
samples of 10 students (Column 8). Increasing the sample size to 20 students per school (Column
9) raises the R-squared to .501, while increasing it further to 40 students per school raises the R-
squared to .640.
Rows (2) and (3) illustrate the impact of adapting the specification in Row (1) by decreasing
or increasing the number of individuals per group. We see that the efficacy of the control function
increases with the number of individuals per group. Decreasing school sizes from 1000 to 500
decreases the R-squared from .972 to .944, while increasing from 1000 to 2000 increases the R-
squared to .986. Interestingly, increasing the number of individuals sorting into each group has
almost no impact on the effectiveness of the control function if the larger number of individuals is
not actually being used to construct the group averages of individual characteristics, X s; Columns
(9) - (11) are nearly identical across Rows (1) - (3).
Comparing Row (4) to Row (1), we see that increasing the number of schools from 50 to 100 has
very little impact on the performance of the control function when the full population of students
is used to construct school averages. Interestingly, reducing the number of schools slightly reduces
42The problem can actually be classified as a binary assignment problem (a subset of linear programming problems),
but we were unable to implement the standard binary assignment algorithms at scale.
43In other simulations not shown, we directly examine the impact of increasing the variance of εis. We find that increas-
ing Var(εis) reduces the between school variance in both Xi and XUi symmetrically, but does not erode the effectiveness
of Xs as a control for XUs if school sizes are sufficiently large (though the finite sample performance of the control func-
tion deteriorates slightly). Intuitively, as Var(εis)→ ∞, idiosyncratic tastes fully drive choice, and the between school
variation in Xi and XUi disappears, so that there is no more sorting problem to address.
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the problems posed by using small samples of students from each school to construct X s. Row
(5) shows that restricting the number of schools in each household’s consideration set from 50 to
10 reduces the control function’s ability to absorb unobservable sorting, but only slightly. The R-
squared drops modestly from Row (1) to Row (5) across all columns (8) - (11). Nonetheless, the
high R-squared in Row (5) reveals that our approach does not require households to be considering
large numbers of schools.
Row (6) illustrates the impact of doubling both the number of observable and unobservable
outcome relevant characteristics. By increasing the numbers of both observable and unobservable
characteristics symmetrically, we can show the impact of utilizing a richer control set while holding
fixed the strength of sorting on observables relative to unobservables.44 Doubling the number of
elements of Xi and XUi increases the R-squared from .972 in Row (1) to .982. This somewhat small
increase understates the importance of the richness of the control set, since the control function
was already nearly perfectly effective for the baseline parameter set. Row (10) shows that when
only 20 students are used to construct sample school averages, doubling the control set from 10
to 20 characteristics increases the R-squared from .501 to .604. This highlights the importance of
collecting data on a wide variety of student/parent inputs that capture different dimensions of taste
(as the panel surveys we use do).
Row (7) shows that doubling the number of amenity factors from 5 to 10 dramatically reduces
the effectiveness of the control function, dropping the R-squared from .972 in Row (1) to .914.
Note, though, that increasing the dimension of the amenity space has a negligible impact when
small samples of students are used to construct school averages (Columns (9) - (11)). However,
Row (8), when compared to Row (6), reveals that the performance of the control function really
depends on the dimension of the amenity space relative to the dimension of Xs, rather than the
absolute number of amenities: when Xs has 20 elements, the fraction of absorbed sorting bias barely
falls when the number of amenities rises from 5 to 10.
Finally, Row (9) displays the results of a specification in which all of theΘk` andΘk`U elements
are drawn independently (ρ = 0). The R-squared falls moderately across columns (8) - (11) relative
to Row (1), which demonstrating the difficulty of fully characterizing the situations in which the
control function will perform adequately: almost every parameter of the model affects the efficacy
of the control function.
Overall, the results in Appendix Table A2 indicate that the control function approach could work
quite well even in settings where 1) individuals have idiosyncratic tastes for particular groups, 2)
there are only moderate number of total groups to join, and 3) only a subset of these are considered
by any given individual. The simulations do suggest, however, that the control function may be less
44In all of these simulations, we assumed that the strength of sorting on unobservables mirrored the strength of sorting
on unobservables. In results not shown, we also experimented with weakening the degree of sorting on unobservables by
making ΘU smaller in magnitude and increasing the variance of κi to compensate. While the control function absorbs a
smaller fraction of the between-school variance in unobservable outcome-relevant characteristics when sorting on these
characteristics is weak, this is precisely the case when the magnitude of the between-school variance in unobservables is
small. Thus, there is very little potential bias to be absorbed!
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effective when 1) the dimension of underlying amenity factors is large relative to the number of
independent factors represented by the observed individual characteristics, or 2) only a sample of
individuals is observed in each group. We revisit the latter concern for our school effects application
in Appendix Section A7 using the North Carolina administrative data.
Note that all the specifications in Appendix Table A2 consider cases in which the conditions
presented in Proposition 1 are satisfied, so that we should expect the control function to perfectly
absorb sorting on observables as the number of students per school gets sufficiently large. However,
there may also be many contexts in which the set of observables is not sufficiently rich to make
our spanning condition plausible. Thus, we are also interested in the extent which the addition of
group-averages of individual characteristics can reduce bias from sorting on unobservables, even if
it cannot eliminate the bias.
Appendix Table A3 presents the results from four specifications representing distinct scenarios
in which our spanning condition fails. The worst-case scenario is one in which the unobservable
characteristics only predict WTP for a set of amenities that the observable characteristics do not
affect taste for. We implement this scenario by setting all the parameters at their values from the
baseline specification from Row (1) of Table A2, but allowing the elements of XUi to only predict
WTP for the last amenity, A5, while the elements of Xi only predict WTP for amenities A1 to A4.
Since the group-averages of the observables and unobservables are functions of disjoint sets of
amenities, it comes as no surprise that only 37% of the variance in XUs is predictable given Xs, even
when the universe of students at each school is observed.
The second scenario alters the first scenario by allowing the unobservable characteristics XUi to
predict WTP for amenities A1 to A4 in addition to A5. The control function performs somewhat
better: 56% of the variance in XUs is absorbed by the coefficients on Xs.
These two scenarios are quite pessimistic, however. If WTP for an amenity is unaffected by the
entire vector Xi, then it seems likely that a subset of the unobservables may not predict WTP for this
amenity either. Thus, we consider two additional scenarios in which WTP for the last amenity (A5)
is only by one of the ten components of the unobserved vector XUi . In the third scenario, X
U
i,10 affects
WTP for A5 only. In the fourth scenario, XUi,10 predicts willingness to pay for all amenities A1 to A5.
Rows (4) and (5) reveal that our control function performs quite well in these scenarios: it absorbs
96% of the variation in XUs when X
U
i,10 predicts WTP for A5 only, and 97% when X
U
i,10 predicts WTP
for all five amenities (compared to the baseline of 97.2% from Row (1)).
We conclude that our control function approach is likely to be quite robust to the violations of
the spanning condition that are arguably the most plausible: those that involve just a few compo-
nents of the individual’s unobservable outcome contribution affecting WTP for just a few additional
amenities for which Xi does not predict preferences.
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A5 Estimation of Model Parameters
In this section we discuss estimation of the coefficients B, G1, and G2. The estimation strategy
depends on the outcome, so we consider the outcomes in turn.
A5.1 Years of Postsecondary Academic Education
Parameter estimation is most straightforward in the case of years of postsecondary academic
education. We estimate B using ordinary least squares regression with high school fixed effects,
which controls for all observed and unobserved school and neighborhood influences.
Recall that Zs is comprised of two components: Zs = [Xs;Z2s]. Z2s consists of school and neigh-
borhood characteristics for which direct measures are available, such as student/teacher ratio, city
size, and school type. Xs consists of school wide averages for each variable in Xsi, such as parental
education or income, which we do not observe directly but must estimate from sample members
at each school. Consequently, the makeup of Xs differs across specifications that use different X
vectors. G1 and G2 are the corresponding subsets of the coefficients in G.
We replace Xs with X¯s, where X¯s is the average of Xi computed over all available students from
the school.45 We estimate G1 and G2 by applying least squares regression to
Ysi−XsiBˆ = X sG1+Z2sG2+ vs,i
using the appropriate panel weights from the surveys.
A5.2 Permanent Wage Rates
Abstracting from the effects of labor market experience and a time trend, let the log wage Ws,i,t
of individual i, from school s, at time t be governed by
Ws,i,t =Ws,i+ es,i,t +ξs,i,t .
In the above equation Ws,i is i’s “permanent” log wage (given that he/she attended high school s) as
of the time by which most students have completed education and spent at least a couple of years in
the labor market, which we take to be 1979 in the case of NLS72. es,i,t is a random walk component
that evolves as a result of luck in the job search process or within a company, or perhaps changes
in motivation or productivity due to health and other factors. We normalize es,i,t to be 0 in 1979.46
45A substantial number of students who appear in the base year of the surveys can be used to construct X¯s but cannot be
used to estimate (A5.1) because some variables, such as test scores, are missing, or because the students are not included
in the follow-up surveys that provide the measure of Ys,i. As we discuss in Section 7, we impute missing values for most
of our explanatory variables prior to estimating B and G, but we do not use the imputed values when constructing the
school averages.
46We include es,i,t as well as ξs,i,t because the earnings dynamics literature typically finds evidence of a highly persistent
wage component. Several studies cannot reject the hypothesis that es,i,t is a random walk. Recent examples include Baker
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ξs,i,t includes measurement error and relatively short term factors that have little influence on the
lifetime earnings of an individual. The determination of the permanent wage is given by 16 with Ysi
defined to be Ws,i. After substituting for Ws,i, the wage equation is
Ws,i,t = Xs,iB+XsG1+Z2sG2+ vs,i+ es,i,t +ξs,i,t .
We estimate B by OLS with school fixed effects included.47
Let W˜s,i,t ≡Ws,i,t −XiBˆ. We estimate G1 and G2 by applying OLS to
W˜s,i,t = X¯sG1+Z2sG2+ vs,i+ es,i,t +ξs,i,t (42)
The presence of ξs,i,t complicates the variance decompositions, as we discuss below.
A5.3 High School Graduation and College Enrollment
The methods outlined in Appendix Sections A5.1 and A5.2 need to be adapted for binary mea-
sures such as high school graduation and college attendance. Consequently, for high school gradu-
ation we reinterpret Ys,i to be the latent variable that determines the indicator for whether a student
graduates, HSGRADs,i. That is,
HSGRADs,i = 1(Ys,i > 0).
Or, after substituting for Ysi,
HSGRADs,i = 1(XiB+XsG1+Z2sG2++vs,i > 0) (43)
We replace Xs with X¯s and estimate the equation
HSGRADs,i = 1(XiB+ X¯sG1+Z2G2+(Xs− X¯s)G1+ vs,i > 0) (44)
using maximum likelihood probit. The procedure for enrollment in a four-year college is analogous
to that of high school graduation.
A6 Decomposing the Variance in Educational Attainment and Wages
In this section we discuss an analysis of variance based on equation that can be used to place a
lower bound on the importance of factors that are common to students from the same school.48 As
and Solon (2003), Haider (2001), and Meghir and Pistaferri (2004).
47In reality, we also include a vector Ti,t consisting of a dummy indicator for the year 1979 (relative to 1986), years
of work experience of i at time t, and experience squared. Let Ψ be the corresponding vector of wage coefficients. We
adjust wages for differences in labor market experience and for whether the data are from 1979 or 1986 by subtracting
Ti,tΨˆ from the wage prior to performing the variance decompositions. The estimate of Ψˆ depends on whether tests,
postsecondary education, or both are in Xsi. We report results with and without these variables. In our main specification,
we exclude postsecondary education from Xsi.
48Jencks and Brown (1975) propose and implement a similar decomposition.
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with parameter estimation, the details of our procedure depend upon the outcome. We begin with
years of postsecondary education.
A6.1 Years of Postsecondary Education
One may decompose Var(Ys,i) into its within and between school components
Var(Ys,i) =Var(Ys,i−Ys)+Var(Ys)
where (Ys,i−Ys) is the part of Ys,i that varies across students in school s and Ys is the average outcome
for students from s. We estimate Var(Ys,i−Ys) by using the sample variances of Var(Ys,i−Y s) with
an appropriate correction for degrees of freedom lost in using the sample mean Y s in place of Ys.
Then Var(Ys) can be estimated as
V̂ar(Ys) = V̂ar(Ys,i)−V̂ar(Ys,i−Ys).
Then, from (A6),
(Ys,i−Ys) = (Xi−Xs)B+(vs,i− vs)
and
Ys = XsB+XsG1+Z2sG2+ vs.
Thus, one may express the outcome variance as49
Var(Yi) = [Var((Xi−Xs)B)+Var(vs,i− vs)]+ (45)
[Var(XsB)+2Cov(XsB,XsG1)+2Cov(XsB,Z2sG2)+Var(XsG1)+ (46)
2Cov(XsG1,Z2sG2)+Var(Z2sG2)+Var(vs)] (47)
Given an estimate of B, Var((Xi− Xs)B) can be estimated using its corresponding sample vari-
ance, Var((Xi−X s)B). Var(vs,i−vs) can then be estimated as V̂ar(Ys,i−Ys)−V̂ar((Xi−Xs)B), and
Var(XsB) can be calculated as V̂ar(XiB)− V̂ar((Xi−Xs)B). One can also estimate the components
Var(XsG1),Var(Z2sG2) of the school/community contribution and the common terms 2Cov(XsB,XsG1),
2Cov(XsB,Z2sG2) and 2Cov(XsG1,Z2sG2) using the estimates of B, G1, G2 and the data X¯s and Z2s.
Var(vs) can be calculated as
V̂ar(vs) =
V̂ar(Ys)−V̂ar(XsB)−V̂ar(XsG1)−V̂ar(Z2sG2)
−2Ĉov(XsB,XsG1)−2Ĉov(XsB,Z2sG2)−2Ĉov(XsG1,Z2sG2)
49The equation below imposes Cov(Xs,iB,vs,i− vs) = 0, which is implied by our definition of B and vs,i− vs. The
equation also assumes Cov(Xs,vs) = 0 and Cov(Z2s,vs) = 0, which are implied by our definition of [G1,G2] and vs (see
Section 5).
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A6.2 Permanent Wage Rates
We focus on decomposing the permanent wage component Ws,i. We take advantage of the ex-
istence of panel data on wages in NLS72 and work with a balanced sample of individuals who
report wages in both 1979 and 1986 (the fourth and fifth follow-ups, respectively). We estimate the
variance in the permanent component of the wage, Var(Ws,i), using the covariance between wage
observations from the same individual in different years
Cov(Ws,i,t ,Ws,i,t ′) = Cov(Ws,i+ es,i,t +ξs,i,t ,Ws,i+ es,i,t ′+ξs,i,t ′)
= Var(Ws,i),
where Cov(ξs,i,t ,ξs,i,t ′) is assumed to be 0 given that the observations are seven years apart and
Cov(es,i,t ,es,i,t ′)= 0 from normalizing es,i,t to be 0 in 1979. We use the sample estimate of Cov(Ws,i,t ,Ws,i,t ′)
as our estimate of Var(Ws,i). We estimate this covariance by subtracting out the global mean for
Ws,i,t , calculating the wage product (Ws,i,t)(Ws,i,t ′) for each individual, and taking a weighted aver-
age across all the individuals in the sample using the weights discussed in Appendix Section A8,
adjusting for degrees of freedom. Similarly, we estimate the between-school component of the per-
manent wage, Var(Ws), by estimating the covariance between wage observations for different years
(1979 and 1986) from different individuals from the same school. Specifically, we use the moment
condition
Cov(Ws,i,t ,Ws, j,t ′) = Cov(Ws,i+ es,i,t +ξs,i,t ,Ws, j + es, j,t ′+ξs, j,t ′), i 6= j, t 6= t ′
= Var(Ws),
where Cov(es,i,t ,es, j,t ′) is defined to be 0, and Cov(ξs,i,t ,ξs, j,t ′) is assumed to be 0. We estimate
this covariance by first calculating ((Ws,i,tWs, j,t ′) + (Ws,i,t ′Ws, j,t))/2 for each pair of individuals i and
j at school s and then computing the weighted mean for each school s. We then average across
schools, weighting each school by the sum of the weights of the individuals who contributed to the
school-specific estimate.
We estimate the corresponding within school component using
V̂ar(Ws,i−Ws) = V̂ar(Ws,i)−V̂ar(Ws).
Given V̂ar(Ws,i), V̂ar(Ws,i−Ws), V̂ar(Ws), Gˆ1, Gˆ2, and Bˆ, estimation of the contributions of
Xs,iB, XsG1, Z2sG2, vs,i, and vs to Var(Wsi) proceeds as in previous subsection.
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A6.3 High School Graduation and College Enrollment
For both of our binary outcomes, high school graduation and enrollment in a four-year college,
we decompose the latent variable that determines the outcome. Given that there is no natural scale
to the variance of the latent variable, we normalize Var(vs,i−vs) to one, and define the total variance
of the latent variable to be
Var(Yi) = [Var((Xi−Xs)B)+1]+ (48)
[Var(XsB)+2Cov(XsB,XsG1)+2Cov(XsB,Z2sG2)+Var(XsG1)+ (49)
2Cov(XsG1,Z2sG2)+Var(Z2sG2)+Var(vs)] (50)
Given that the raw variance component estimates are specific to the choice of normalization, we
instead report fractions of the variance contributed by the various components.
A6.4 Calculation of Standard Errors
We calculate bootstrap standard errors for each of our point estimates and bound estimates based
on re-sampling schools with replacement, with 150 replications. To preserve the size distribution
of the samples of students from particular schools, we divide the sample into 5 school sample size
classes and resample schools within class.
A7 Evaluating the Magnitude of Bias from Limited Samples of Stu-
dents Per School
Before considering estimates from the three survey datasets, we first use the North Carolina
sample to better gauge the biases produced by the student sampling schemes used by each survey.
The monte carlo simulations in Section 4 suggested that estimation based on subsamples of 20
students per school (similar to those in the three datasets) could result in a substantial decrease
in the ability of school-average observables to capture sorting on unobservables. However, these
simulations are based on particular assumptions about the dimensionality of the underlying desired
amenities, the joint distribution of the observable and unobservable characteristics, and the degree
to which these characteristics predict tastes for schools/neighborhoods.
In this appendix, we assess the potential for bias in our survey-based estimates more directly
by drawing samples of students from North Carolina schools using either the NLS72, NELS88,
or ELS2002 sampling schemes and re-estimate the model for high school graduation using these
samples. By comparing the results derived from such samples to the true results based on the
universe of students in North Carolina, we can determine which if any of the survey datasets is
likely to produce reliable results. To remove the chatter produced by a single draw from these
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sampling schemes, we computed estimate averages over 100 samples drawn from each sampling
scheme.
Table A4 presents the results of this exercise. For comparison, the first column of Panel A
presents the variance decomposition described in Section 6 for the full North Carolina sample,
while the first column of Panel B converts these variance components isolating school/neighborhood
effects into our lower bound estimates of the average impact of moving from the 10th to the 90th
quantile of the distribution of school/neighborhood contributions. Columns 2 through 5 display the
results from recompute these estimates subsamples of the North Carolina population featuring with
the same distributions of school-specific sample sizes as in NLS72, ELS, grade 8 schools in NELS88
and grade 10 schools in NELS88.50 Column 2 displays the results from recomputing these estimates
using subsamples of the North Carolina student population featuring the distribution school-specific
sample sizes observed among 12th grade schools in NLS72. We see that the use of small student
samples at each school produces may actually produce a relatively small amount of bias. Most of
the rows of Panel A match quite closely across Columns 1 and 2. Of particular interest are the last
two rows of Panel A: we see that the NLS72 sample size distribution overstates the true variance
fraction for the lower bound without common shocks, Var(Z2sG2), by 0.88%, and understates true
variance fraction for the lower bound that may include common shocks, Var(Z2sG2+vs), by 0.38%.
These translate to over/under estimates of the impact of a 10th-90th quantile shift in school quality
on the probability of graduation of .0188 and .0111, respectively. Comparing the full NC sample
with the NELS88 grade 8 and ELS2002 results (Columns 3 and 5), we see a similar pattern. These
results are comforting, and suggest that the estimates from these samples may overstate the lower
bound slightly in the estimates that attempt to exclude common shocks, but may even understate
appropriate lower bound estimates that include common shocks.
Column 4 reports results from NELS88 in which students are grouped by their 10th grade school
rather than their 8th grade school. Since grade 10 schools were not part of the original NELS88 sam-
pling frame, they feature particularly small samples of students, and only produce large samples of
students to the extent that many students from a given grade 8 school attend the same grade 10
school. These results reveal that considerable bias may be produced if student samples are suffi-
ciently small. Looking at the last two rows of Panel A, we that the NELS grade 10 sample size
distribution overstates the true variance fraction for the lower bound without common shocks by 1.7
percent, and the lower bound with common shocks by 1.4 percent. These translate to overestimates
of the impact of a 10th-90th quantile shift in school quality of 3.9 percentage points and 2.2 per-
centage points, respectively. Due the poor performance of the NELS grade 10 school sample size
distribution in our simulation test, we do not report any NELS88 results that group students by their
grade 10 school.
5010th grade schools in NELS88 are the schools in which the original 8th grade NELS sample are observed in the first
follow-up survey.
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A8 Construction and Use of Weights
In the NLS72 analyses of four-year college enrollment and postsecondary years of education, we
use a set of panel weights (w22) designed to make nationally representative a sample of respondents
who completed the base-year and fourth-follow up (1979) questionnaires. For the NLS72 wage
analysis, we chose a set of panel weights (comvrwt) designed for all 1986 survey respondents for
whom information exists on 5 of 6 key characteristics: high school grades, high school program,
educational attainment as of 1986, gender, race, and socioeconomic status. Since there are very
few 1986 respondents who did not also respond in 1979, this weight matches the wage sample
fairly well. For the NELS88 sample, we use a set of weights (f3pnlwt) designed to make nationally
representative the sample of respondents who completed the first four rounds of questionnaires
(through 1994, when our outcomes are measured). For the ELS02 sample, we use a set of weights
(f2bywt) designed to make nationally representative a sample of respondents who completed the
second follow up questionnaire (2006) and for whom information was available on certain key
baseline characteristics (gathered either in the base year questionnaire or the first follow-up). This
seemed most appropriate given that our outcomes are measured in the 2006 questionnaire and we
require non-missing observations on key characteristics for inclusion in the sample.
We use panel weights in the estimation for a number of reasons. The first is to reduce the in-
fluence of choice-based sampling, which is an issue in NELS88 and in the wage analysis based on
NLS72. The second is to correct for non-random attrition from follow-up surveys. The third is a
pragmatic adjustment to account for the possibility that the link between the observables and out-
comes involves interaction terms or nonlinearities that we do not include. The weighted estimates
may provide a better indication of average effects in such a setting. Finally, various populations
and school types were oversampled in the three datasets, so that applying weights makes our sam-
ple more representative of the universe of American 8th graders, 10th graders, and 12th graders,
respectively. Note, though, that we do not adjust weights for item non-response associated with the
key variables required for inclusion in our sample. Thus, even after weighting, our estimates do not
represent estimates of population parameters for the populations of American high school students
of which the surveys were designed to be representative.
A9 Other Applications: Estimating Teacher Value-Added
This section examines how our central insight that group-averages of observed individual char-
acteristics can control for group-averages of unobserved individual characteristics can be extended
to contexts in which group assignments are determined by a central administrator rather in a de-
centralized competitive equilibrium. The particular context we consider is one in which a school
principal is assigning students to classrooms based on a combination of observed and unobserved
(to the econometrician) student inputs, where the goal is to estimate each teacher’s value-added to
test score achievement.
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A9.1 Sorting of Students Across Class Rooms
Assume for now the administrator has already determined which teachers to allocate to which
courses for which periods of the day, so that a classroom c can be effectively captured by a vector of
amenity values Ac. Consider first the case in which none of amenities reflect the demographic make
up of the class and are endogenous to the principal’s assignment decisions, so that the amenity vector
Ac can be considered exogenous to the principal’s student-to-classroom allocation problem. Instead,
these amenities may include the principal’s perceptions of various teacher attributes or skills, but
could also include classroom amenities unrelated to teacher quality that might reflect whether the
heating works, the quality of classroom technology in the room, the time in the day that the class
is held, or the difficulty level of the class. As noted in Section 9, exogeneity of the amenity vector
may be a reasonable assumption in some high school and college contexts in which students submit
course preferences and a schedule-making algorithm assigns students to classrooms.
We can then adapt the utility function featured in equation (2) to model the payoff that the prin-
cipal obtains from assigning student i to class c (simply replace all s subscripts with c subscripts).
As before, Xi is a vector of student characteristics that are observed by the econometrician and are
relevant for the outcome Yi, the student’s end-of-year standardized test score. Similarly, XUi is a
vector of student characteristics that are unobserved by the econometrician but are observed by the
principal and are relevant for test score performance, and κi represents a vector of student character-
istics that are unobserved by the econometrician and observed by the principal, but do not affect test
score performance. The Θ parameter matrix might capture a principal’s belief about which types
of students are most likely to benefit from a better teacher or difficulty level. Θ might also reflect
a desire to placate parents or students, where students/parents with certain values of Xi or XUi are
more likely to advocate for particular classroom assignments. Some parental or student character-
istics may predict a stronger preference for a particular difficulty level or time of day, while others
predict a stronger preference for teacher quality. Similarly, the idiosyncratic match value εci might
capture, for example, the desire to fulfill a particular parent’s request that their child be assigned to
the same teacher that his brother had. Thus, we model parent and student preferences as affecting
choice through their impact on principal preferences.51
Suppose, as in Appendix Section A3, that the space of classroom amenities is continuous, that
εic = 0 ∀ (i,c), and that the distributions of both student characteristics and student-weighted class-
room amenities Ac(i) are jointly normal. Recall that the efficiency implications of alternative alloca-
tions only depend on the summary taste vector λi ≡ (XiΘ+XUi ΘU +κ). Let f (λi) denote the PDF
of λi across the student population, and let U(λ ,A) = λA denote the rewritten utility function. Then
51Rothstein (2009) provide a useful classroom assignment model in which principals assign students to classrooms
based on student characteristics that are observable to both the principal and the econometrician Xi and student character-
istics that are only available to the principal (part of XUi ). He discusses bias in VAM models that include Xi and possible
some other controls. He does not study the potential for Xc to control for XUc .
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we can write the principal’s problem as:
max
Ψ
∫ λ
λ
U(λ ,Ψλ ) f (λ )dλ
s.t. E[Ψλ ] = E[A]
s.t. Var(Ψλ ) =Var(A)
where we have restricted our attention to linear allocations of the form Ac(i) = Ψλi. Note that the
constraints represent the same feasibility conditions as those from the school choice problem solved
in Appendix Section A3, and pareto optimality remains a necessary condition for the objective
function
∫ λ
λ U(λ ,Ψγ) f (λ )dλ to be maximized. Indeed, the equivalence of the two problems is
essentially a manifestation of the first and second welfare theorems. Consequently, the solution
Ψ = Σ−1/2λ ′ (Σ
1/2
γ ′ ΣAΣ
1/2
λ ′ )Σ
−1/2
λ ′ will also be the same. Furthermore, if the spanning condition Θ
U =
RΘ˜ is satisfied for some matrix R, Xc will be a linear function of XUc .
However, in the elementary and middle school contexts, it seems particularly likely that some
elements of Ac could reflect the student makeup of the class. Including anticipated peer effects
complicates the specification of principal preferences, since now the utility from assigning a given
student to a classroom would depend on the other students assigned to the classroom. The classroom
sorting problem differs from the school/neighborhood sorting problem in that the principal would
internalize the effect that allocating a student to c has on Ac, while parents would take As as given.
We have not yet solved a classroom assignment problem with endogenous amenities.
A9.2 Implications for Estimation of Teacher Value Added
Suppose that the true classroom contribution to a given student i’s test scores can be captured
by ZcΓ+ZUc(i),iΓ
U , mirroring equation (16). As before, partition the vector of observed classroom
characteristics into two parts Zc = [Xc,Z2c], where Xc captures classroom averages of observed stu-
dent characteristics, and Z2c represents other observed classroom characteristics. 52 Consider the
classroom version of our estimating equation (29):
Yi = Xiβ +XcG1+Z2cG2+ vci, (51)
When past test scores are elements of Xi and a design matrix Dc(i) indicating which classrooms were
taught by which teachers is included in Z2c, equation (51) represents a standard teacher value-added
specification.53
Suppose that Proposition 1 can be extended to classroom choice setting (as proven in the ex-
ogenous amenities case) and that the corresponding spanning condition is satisfied, so that Xc and
XUc are linearly dependent. Suppose in addition that the principal’s perception of teacher quality is
52We assume here that teacher quality is not classroom-specific, as in most teacher value-added models.
53Z2c might also include a set of indicators for the teacher’s experience level.
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noisy, so that Dc is not collinear with Ac (and therefore not collinear with Xc). Then our analysis in
Section 5.3 suggests that G2 = Γ2 +ΠZUc Z2cΓ
U . Since Z2c includes the teacher design matrix Dc(i),
we see that including classroom averages of student characteristics Xc in teacher value-added re-
gressions will purge estimates of individual teachers’ value-added from any bias from non-random
student sorting on either observables or unobservables. Any remaining bias ΠZUc Z2cΓ
U stems from
the possible correlation between the assignment of the chosen teacher to the classroom and other
aspects of the classroom environment.
However, suppose that all unobserved classroom factors that are inequitably distributed across
teachers are either being used as a basis for student allocation to classrooms or are directly included
as other controls in Zc. Then the analysis in Section 5.3.1 reveals that including classroom averages
of observed student characteristics will also purge teacher value-added estimates G2 of any omitted
variables bias driven by inequitable access to advantageous classroom environments (the subvector
of ΠZUc Z2c corresponding to the teacher design matrix Dc will equal 0).
Of course, our simulations suggest that the effectiveness of the control function approach de-
pends on observing reasonably large samples of students with each teacher. And in practice there
may be classroom factors ignored by students and principals that do not even out across teachers.
While these caveats should be kept in mind, our analysis may partially explain the otherwise sur-
prising finding that non-experimental OLS estimators of teacher quality produce nearly unbiased
estimates of true teacher quality as ascertained by quasi-experimental and experimental estimates
(Chetty et al. (2014), Kane and Staiger (2008)).
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Appendix Tables
Table A1: Principal Components Analysis of the Vector of School Average Observable
Characteristics Xs
Panel A: Fraction of Total Variance in Xs
Explained by Various Numbers of Principal Components
NLS72 NELS88 gr8 ELS2002
Baseline Full Baseline Full Baseline Full
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) # of Variables in Xs 32 34 39 49 40 51
# Factors Needed to Explain:
(2) 75% of Total Xs Var. 7 7 7 9 6 8
(3) 90% of Total Xs Var. 12 12 13 16 11 14
(4) 95% of Total Xs Var. 15 15 17 20 14 19
(5) 99% of Total Xs Var. 20 21 22 26 20 25
(6) 100% of Total Xs Var. 23 24 27 32 26 33
Panel B: Fraction of Variance in the Regression Index XsGˆ1
Explained by Various Numbers of Principal Components
NLS NELS gr8 ELS
Baseline Full Baseline Full Baseline Full
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) # of Variables in Xs 32 34 39 49 40 51
# Factors Needed to Explain:
(2) 75% of Var(XsG1) 3 3 6 5 2 5
(3) 90% of Var(XsG1) 8 7 10 10 5 11
(4) 95% of Var(XsG1) 10 9 13 13 7 15
(5) 99% of Var(XsG1) 14 15 19 20 14 22
(6) 100% of Var(XsG1) 23 24 27 32 26 33
See Section A2 for details.
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Table A2: Monte Carlo Simulation Results: Cases in which the Spanning Condition
in Proposition 1 is Satisfied (ΘU = RΘ For Some R)
Row # Stu. # Sch. # Con. # Ob. # Un. # Am. Θ Corr R-Sq (All) R-Sq (10) R-Sq (20) R-Sq (40)
(1) 1000 50 50 10 10 5 0.25 0.972 0.368 0.501 0.640
(2) 500 50 50 10 10 5 0.25 0.944 0.374 0.497 0.641
(3) 2000 50 50 10 10 5 0.25 0.986 0.376 0.497 0.644
(4) 1000 100 50 10 10 5 0.25 0.969 0.293 0.443 0.595
(5) 1000 50 10 10 10 5 0.25 0.968 0.354 0.479 0.619
(6) 1000 50 50 20 20 5 0.25 0.982 0.495 0.604 0.715
(7) 1000 50 50 10 10 10 0.25 0.914 0.363 0.482 0.608
(8) 1000 50 50 20 20 10 0.25 0.976 0.492 0.580 0.682
(9) 1000 50 50 10 10 5 0 0.958 0.320 0.422 0.566
# Stu.: Number of students per school
# Sch.: Total number of schools
# Con.: Number of schools in each family’s consideration set
# Ob: Number of observable student characteristics
# Un: Number of unobservable student characteristics
# Am.: Number of latent amenity factors valued by families
Θ Corr: Correlation in Θlk taste parameters across student characteristics for a given amenity and across amenities
for a given student characteristic
R-sq(all): Fraction of between-school variance in unobservable student characteristics XUs βU explained by the con-
trol function X s (sample averages X s computed using all students)
R-sq(10/20/40): Fraction of between-school variance in unobservable student characteristics XUs βU explained by
the control function X s (sample school averages X s computed using 10/20/40 students)
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Table A3: Monte Carlo Simulation Results: Cases in which the Spanning Condition
in Proposition 1 Fails
Row WTP for A1−A4 WTP for A5 R-Sq (All) R-Sq (10) R-Sq (20) R-Sq (40)
(1) Depends on all elements of Depends on all elements of 0.972 0.368 0.501 0.640
Xi and XUi Xi and X
U
i
(2) Depends on each element of Depends on each element of 0.369 0.260 0.282 0.313
Xi, independent of all XUi X
U
i , independent of Xi
(3) Depends on all elements of Depends on each element of 0.561 0.296 0.361 0.440
Xi and XUi X
U
i , independent of Xi
(4) Depends on all elements of Depends on only on XUi,10 0.961 0.367 0.490 0.635
Xi and XUi
(5) Depends on all elements of Depends only on XUi,10 0.970 0.406 0.553 0.693
Xi and XUi except X
U
i,10
All specifications in Panel B share the following parameter values: # Stu. = 1000, # Sch. = 50, # Con. = 50, # Ob =
10, # Un = 10, # Am. = 5, Θ Corr = 0.25 (See Table A2 for definitions of parameters).
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Table A4: Bias from Observing Subsamples of Students from Each School: Comparing Results
from the Full North Carolina Sample to Results from Subsamples Mirroring the Sampling
Schemes of NLS72, NELS88, and ELS2002
Panel A: Fractions of Total Outcome Variance
Row Full NC Sample NLS72 NELSg8 NELSg10 ELS2002
Within School:
Total 0.9153 0.9126 0.9131 0.8763 0.9120
Var(Yis−Ys)
Observable Student-Level (Within): 0.1244 0.1296 0.1296 0.1301 0.1285
Var((Xsi−Xs)B)
Unobservable Student-Level (Within) 0.7909 0.7828 0.7834 0.7461 0.7834
Var(vsi− vs)
Between School:
Total 0.0847 0.0874 0.0869 0.1237 0.088
Var(Ys)
Observable Student-Level: 0.0181 0.018 0.0183 0.0179 0.0184
Var(XsB)
Student-Level/ 0.0165 0.0175 0.0170 0.0187 0.175School-Level Covariance
2∗Cov(XsB,XsG1 +Z2sG2)
School-Avg. Student-Level/ -0.0166 -0.0047 0.0061 -0.0053 -0.0054School Char. Covariance
2∗Cov(XsG1,Z2sG2)
School-Avg. Student-Level 0.0178 0.0125 0.0137 0.0290 0.0139
Var(XsG1)
School Char. 0.0181 0.0269 0.023 0.0353 0.0238
Var(Z2sG2)
Unobservable School-Level 0.0309 0.0173 0.0211 0.0283 0.0199
Var(vs)
Panel B: 10th to 90th Quantile Shifts in School Quality
Row Full NC Sample NLS72 NELSg8 NELSg10 ELS2002
LB no unobs 0.1056 0.1254 0.1167 0.1435 0.1177
Var(Z2sG2)
LB w/unobs 0.1742 0.1631 0.164 0.1959 0.1626
Var(Z2sG2 + vs)
The column “Full NC Sample” reports variance decompositions based on the full North Carolina sample. They are the same as the
estimates reported for NC sample in Appendix Table A8.
The other columns report estimates based on draws of samples of students from the North Carolina schools to match the distributions
of sample sizes per school from the NLS72, NELS88 grade 8, NELS88 grade 10, or ELS2002 samples (respectively).
To remove the chatter produced by a single draw from these sampling schemes, we report averages of estimates for each of 100
samples drawn from each sampling scheme.
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Table A5: NLS72: Variables Used in Baseline and Full (in Italics) Specifications
Student Characteristics
Race Indicators, Gender Indicator
Student Ability
Math Standardized Score, Reading Standardized Score
Student Behavior
Family Background
Standardized SES, Number of Siblings, Indicators for Presence Biological Parents at Home,
Father’s Years of Education, Mother’s Years of Education, Moth. Yrs. Ed. Missing,
Log(Family Income),1(English Spoken at Home), Indicators for Parental Religion,
Indicators for Father’s Occupation Group, Indicators for Mother’s Occupation Group
Home Environment Indicators (1st Principal Component)
Parental Expectations
School Characteristics (Treated as elements of Xs)*
School Pct. Minority
School Characteristics (Treated as elements of Z2s)
1(Catholic School), 1(Private Non-Catholic School), Total School Enrollment,
Student-Teacher Ratio, Pct. Teacher Turnover Since Last Year,
Pct. of Teachers w/ Master’s Degrees or More, School Teacher Pct. Minority,
1(Tracking System), Age of School Building, Distance to 4-year College
Distance to Community College
Neighborhood Characteristics (Treated as elements of Z2s)
Urbanicity Indicators (Detailed), Indicators for U.S. Census Region
*School characteristics treated as elements of Xs are included to reduce measurement error in school sample averages of student charac-
teristics. They do not contribute to the estimated lower bound on the contribution of schools/neighbhorhoods to outcomes.
School averages of all individual-level variables are also included in each specification.
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Table A6: NELS88: Variables Used in Baseline and Full (in Italics) Specifications
Student Characteristics
Race Indicators, 1(Female), 1(Immigrant), Self-Reported Athleticism Index
Student Ability
Math Standardized Score, Reading Standardized Score
Student Behavior
Hrs./Wk. Spent on Homework, Parents Often Check Homework,
Hrs./Wk. Spent on Leisure Reading, Hrs./Wk. Spent Watching TV,
Physical Fight This Year
Family Background
Standardized SES, Number of Siblings, Indicators for Presence Biological Parents at Home,
Father’s Years of Education, Mother’s Years of Education, Moth. Yrs. Ed. Missing,
Log(Family Income),1(English Spoken at Home), Indicators for Parental Religion,
1(Parents are Married), 1(Immigrant Father), 1(Immigrant Mother),
Indicators for Father’s Occupation Group, Indicators for Mother’s Occupation Group,
Home Environment Indicators (1st Principal Component),
Parental School Involvement Indicators (1st Principal Component)
Parental Expectations
Mother’s Desired Yrs. of Ed., Father’s Desired Yrs. of Ed.
School Characteristics (Treated as elements of Xs)*
School Pct. Minority, School Pct. Free/Reduced Price Lunch,
School Pct. LEP, School Pct. Special Ed.,
School Pct. Remedial Reading, School Pct. Remedial Math
School Characteristics (Treated as elements of Z2s)
1(Catholic School), 1(Private Non-Catholic School), Total School Enrollment,
Student-Teacher Ratio, Pct. Teacher Turnover Since Last Year, Log(Min. Teacher Salary)
Pct. of Teachers w/ Master’s Degrees or More, School Teacher Pct. Minority,
1(Gifted Program Exists), 1(Collectively Bargained Contract),
School Security Policy Indicators (1st and 2nd Principal Components)
Neighborhood Characteristics (Treated as elements of Z2s)
Urbanicity Indicators (Urban/Suburban/Rural), Indicators for U.S. Census Region
*School characteristics treated as elements of Xs are included to reduce measurement error in school sample averages of student charac-
teristics. They do not contribute to the estimated lower bound on the contribution of schools/neighbhorhoods to outcomes.
School averages of all individual-level variables are also included in each specification.
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Table A7: ELS2002: Variables Used in Baseline and Full (in Italics) Specifications
Student Characteristics
Race Indicators, 1(Female), 1(Immigrant)
Student Ability
Math Standardized Score, Reading Standardized Score
Student Behavior
Hrs./Wk. Spent on Homework, Parents Often Check Homework,
Hrs./Wk. Spent on Leisure Reading, Hrs./Wk. Spent Watching TV,
Hrs./Wk. Spent on Computer, Physical Fight This Year
Family Background
Standardized SES, Number of Siblings, Indicators for Presence Biological Parents at Home,
Father’s Years of Education, Mother’s Years of Education, Moth. Yrs. Ed. Missing,
Average of Grandparents’ Education, Log(Family Income),1(English Spoken at Home),
Indicators for Parental Religion, 1(Parents are Married), 1(Immigrant Father), 1(Immigrant Mother),
Indicators for Father’s Occupation Group, Indicators for Mother’s Occupation Group,
Home Environment Indicators (1st Principal Component),
Parental School Involvement Indicators (1st Principal Component)
Parental Expectations
Mother’s Desired Yrs. of Ed., Father’s Desired Yrs. of Ed.
School Characteristics (Treated as elements of Xs)*
School Pct. Minority, School Pct. Free/Reduced Price Lunch,
School Pct. LEP, School Pct. Special Ed.,
School Pct. Remedial Reading, School Pct. Remedial Math,
Frequency of Fights (Administrator’s Impression)
School Characteristics (Treated as elements of Z2s)
1(Catholic School), 1(Private Non-Catholic School), Total School Enrollment,
Student-Teacher Ratio, Pct. Teacher Turnover Since Last Year, Log(Min. Teacher Salary)
Pct. of Teachers w/ Master’s Degrees or More, Pct. of Teachers w/Certification,
School Teacher Pct. Minority, 1(Minimum Competency Test Exists),
Teacher Evaluation Mechanism Indicators (1st Principal Component),
Teacher Incentives Indicators (1st Principal Component) School Security Policy Indicators (1st and 2nd Principal Components)
School Security Implementation (ELS Facility Inspection, 1st and 2nd Principal Components)
School Environment Indicators (ELS Facility Inspection, 1st and 2nd Principal Components),
School Facilities Indicators (Administrator Survey, 1st and 2nd Principal Components),
Teacher Access to Technology Indicators (Administrator Survey, 1st Principal Component),
Neighborhood Characteristics (Treated as elements of Z2s)
Urbanicity Indicators (Detailed), Indicators for U.S. Census Region
Neighborhood Crime Level Category (Sch. Administrator Survey)
*School characteristics treated as elements of Xs are included to reduce measurement error in school sample averages of student charac-
teristics. They do not contribute to the estimated lower bound on the contribution of schools/neighbhorhoods to outcomes.
School averages of all individual-level variables are also included in each specification.
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Table A8: Variables Included in Specifications Using
North Carolina Administrative Data
Student Characteristics
Female, Black, Hispanic, Asian
Student Ability
Math Standardized Score (Grades 7 & 8), Reading Standardized Score (Grades 7 & 8)
Designated Gifted Student (Math), Designated Gifted Student (Reading)
Student Behavior
Hrs./Wk. Spent on Homework (Indicator Variables),
Hrs./Wk. Spent on Leisure Reading (Indicator Variables)
Hrs./Wk. Spent Watching TV (Indicator Variables)
Family Background
Responding Parent Educational Attainment Category Indicator Variables
Ever Eligible for Free/Reduced Price Lunch
Currently Limited English Proficiency
Ever Limited English Proficiency
School Characteristics (Treated as elements of Z2s)
Magnet School, Charter School, Student-Teacher Ratio,
Pct. Teacher Turnover Since Last Year
Pct. on College Prep. Track
Pct. of Teachers w/ Master’s Degrees or More
Average Pct. Daily Attendance,
School Teacher Pct. Highly Qualified
Total School Enrollment
Neighborhood Characteristics (Treated as elements of Z2s)
Urbanicity Indicator Variables (12 Categories)
School averages of all individual-level variables are also included in each specification.
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Table A9: Decomposition of Variance in Latent Index Determining High School Graduation from
the NC, NELS88, and ELS2002 Datasets (Baseline and Full Specifications)
NC NELS88 gr8 ELS2002
Fraction of Variance Baseline Full Baseline Full Baseline Full
Within School:
Total 0.915 0.919 0.830 0.836 0.874 0.881
Var(Yi−Ys) (0.016) (0.015) (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Observable Student-Level (Within): 0.124 0.213 0.162 0.292 0.134 0.221
Var((Xi−Xs)B) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.015) (0.035) (0.037)
Unobservable Student-Level (Within) 0.791 0.706 0.668 0.543 0.740 0.660
Var(vsi− vs) (0.014) (0.013) (0.019) (0.017) (0.030) (0.031)
Between School:
Total 0.085 0.081 0.170 0.164 0.126 0.119
Var(Ys) (0.016) (0.015) (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Observable Student-Level: 0.018 0.033 0.073 0.109 0.037 0.060
Var(XsB) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.012) (0.005) (0.008)
Student-Level/
School-Level Covariance 0.016 0.010 0.025 0.007 0.025 0.006
2∗Cov(XsB,XsG1 +Z2sG2) (0.003) (0.005) (0.019) (0.019) (0.010) (0.011)
School-Avg. Student-Level/
School Char. Covariance -0.017 -0.008 0.007 0.004 0.001 -0.002
2∗Cov(XsG1,Z2sG2) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012)
School-Avg. Student-Level 0.018 0.009 0.037 0.029 0.028 0.029
Var(XsG1) (0.005) (0.004) (0.013) (0.007) (0.014) (0.012)
School Char. 0.018 0.012 0.011 0.006 0.025 0.024
Var(Z2sG2) (0.008) (0.004) (0.019) (0.004) (0.012) (0.011)
Unobservable School-Level 0.031 0.026 0.017 0.010 0.010 0.001
Var(vs) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
The table reports fractions of the total variance of the latent index that determines high school gradua-
tion.
The rows labels indicate the variance component.
Bootstrap standard errors based on resampling at the school level are in parentheses.
Appendix Sections 5 and 6 discuss estimation of model parameters and the variance decompositions.
The columns headed NC refers to a variance decomposition that uses the 9th grade school as the group
variable for schools in North Carolina.
NELS88 gr8 is based on the the NELS88 sample and refers to a decomposition that uses the 8th grade
school as the group variable.
ELS2002 is based on the ELS2002 sample and refers to a decomposition that uses the 10th grade
school as the group variable.
For each data set the variables in the baseline model and the full model are specified in Web Appendix
Tables A5 - A8
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Table A10: Decomposition of Variance in Latent Index Determining Enrollment in a Four-Year
College from the NLS72, NELS88, and ELS2002 Datasets (Baseline and Full Specifications)
NLS72 NELS88 gr8 ELS2002
Fraction of Variance Baseline Full Baseline Full Baseline Full
Within School:
Total 0.857 0.857 0.776 0.774 0.785 0.791
Var(Yis−Ys) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014)
Observable Student-Level (Within): 0.176 0.354 0.192 0.316 0.184 0.330
Var((Xsi−Xs)B) (0.029) (0.017) (0.010) (0.012) (0.016) (0.013)
Unobservable Student-Level (Within) 0.681 0.503 0.584 0.458 0.600 0.461
Var(vsi− vs) (0.027) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.016) (0.012)
Between School:
Total 0.143 0.143 0.224 0.226 0.215 0.209
Var(Ys) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014)
Observable Student-Level: 0.042 0.062 0.010 0.143 0.079 0.127
Var(XsB) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) (0.012) (0.007) (0.009)
Student-Level/
School-Level Covariance 0.037 0.032 0.057 0.027 0.071 0.039
2∗Cov(XsB,XsG1 +Z2sG2) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) (0.014) (0.009) (0.011)
School-Avg. Student-Level/
School Char. Covariance 0.000 -0.002 0.004 0.005 -.003 -0.002
2∗Cov(XsG1,Z2sG2) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006)
School-Avg. Student-Level 0.026 0.020 0.023 0.021 0.022 0.015
Var(XsG1) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
School Char. 0.026 0.019 0.018 0.015 0.024 0.018
Var(Z2sG2) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006)
Unobservable School-Level 0.012 0.013 0.021 0.014 0.022 0.013
Var(vs) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
The table reports fractions of the total variance of the latent index that determines enrollment in a
4-year college two years after high school graduation.
The rows labels indicate the variance component.
Bootstrap standard errors based on resampling at the school level are in parentheses.
NLS72 refers to a variance decomposition that employs NLS72 data and uses the 12th grade school as
the group variable.
See the note to Table A9 for additional details.
70
Table A11: Decomposition of Variance in Years of Post-Secondary Education and Adult Log
Wages using NLS72 (Baseline and Full Specifications)
Yrs. Postsec. Ed.
Perm. Wages Perm. Wages
No Post-sec Ed. w/ Post-sec Ed.
Fraction of Variance Baseline Full Baseline Full Baseline Full
Within School:
Total 0.904 0.904 0.837 0.834 0.829 0.829
Var(Yis−Ys) (0.007) (0.008) (0.019) (0.017) (0.022) (0.021)
Observable Student-Level (Within): 0.154 0.280 0.140 0.174 0.212 0.224
Var((Xsi−Xs)B) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013)
Unobservable Student-Level (Within) 0.749 0.624 0.697 0.660 0.617 0.605
Var(vsi− vs) (0.007) (0.008) (0.020) (0.019) (0.024) (0.025)
Between School:
Total 0.096 0.096 0.163 0.166 0.171 0.171
Var(Ys) (0.007) (0.008) (0.019) (0.017) (0.022) (0.021)
Observable Student-Level: 0.041 0.058 0.045 0.055 0.061 0.065
Var(XsB) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
Student-Level/
School-Level Covariance 0.031 0.023 0.033 0.028 0.033 0.029
2∗Cov(XsB,XsG1 +Z2sG2) (0.003) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009)
School-Avg. Student-Level/
School Char. Covariance 0.024 0.016 -0.002 0.001 -.003 0.000
2∗Cov(XsG1,Z2sG2) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
School-Avg. Student-Level 0.012 0.008 0.033 0.029 0.029 0.028
Var(XsG1) (0.003) (0.002) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011)
School Char. 0.017 0.010 0.039 0.041 0.039 0.040
Var(Z2sG2) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Unobservable School-Level 0.005 0.004 0.014 0.011 0.011 0.009
Var(vs) (0.003) (0.002) (0.012) (0.009) (0.018) (0.017)
The table reports fractions of the total variance of years of postsecondary education, permanent wages
controlling for year of post secondary education, and permanent wages not controlling for years of
post secondary education.
Bootstrap standard errors based on re-sampling at the school level are in parentheses.
See the note to Table A9 for additional details.
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